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PRINCIPLES AND PASSIONS: THE INTERSECTION OF
ABORTION AND GUN RIGHTs*
Nicholas J. Johnson**
In this article, Professor Nicholas J. Johnson explores the paral-
lels between the right of armed self-defense and the woman's right to
abortion. Professor Johnson demonstrates that the theories and prin-,
ciples advanced to support the abortion right intersect substantially
with an individual's right to armed self-defense. Professor Johnson
uncovers common ground between the gun and abortion rights-two
rights that have come to symbolize society's deepest social and cultur-
al divisions-divisions that prompt many to embrace the abortion
right while summarily rejecting the gun right. Unreflective dispar-
agement of the gun right, he argues, threatens the vitality of the
abortion choice theories with which gun-rights arguments intersect
and suggests that society's most difficult questions are settled not on
principle, but by people's passions.
INTRODUCTION
Rights are costly. Wesley Hohfeld's classic account casts
rights as a privilege to inflict harm.1 Nowhere is this critique
more apt than the hotly contested "rights"2 to abort an un-
wanted fetus, and to own a gun for private self-defense. These
* Copyright 1997 Nicholas J. Johnson. All rights reserved.
Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
J.D. Harvard University School of Law. I am grateful for the comments
of Jill Fisch, Russ Pearce, Don Kates, Linda McClain, Jim Fleming and
Martin Flaherty. Special thanks to C.B. Kates.
' See J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics,
44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119, 1129 (1990). See also Wesley N. Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-32 (1913).
2 1 use quotations here to acknowledge the controversy over whether
the Constitution, properly construed, guarantees these rights. As I will
discuss, these views often come from opposite ends of the political spec-
trum, but ring similar in form and tone.
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rights are in one sense the ultimate liberties. They have the
capacity to absolutely consume very substantial competing in-
terests, making unparalleled demands on our tolerance of the
costs that rights impose. Yet, our generation, amidst much con-
troversy, has continued to tolerate both abortion rights and
gun rights and their costs.3
This is due substantially to our recognition that these liber-
ties allow what might be crucial private choices in extreme
personal crises. However we come down politically, in truly
desperate circumstances many of us might want for ourselves
or someone we love the option offered by these two most con-
troversial rights.4
While an alliance between NARAL5 and the NRA6 seems
unlikely,7 the common theme of preserving a vital option in a
life-changing or life-threatening crisis has produced significant
' I have suggested elsewhere that our willingness to endorse costly
rights is the best test of whether we take rights seriously. See Nicholas
J. Johnson, Plenary Power and Constitutional Outcasts: Federal Power,
Critical Race Theory and the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, 57
OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1588 n.122 (1996).
" While this is harder to show in the abortion context, Nelson Lund
offers an array of illustrations that the fear of violent death is a deep
passion that "nags at us all with two messages: arm yourself or those
you control and disarm those whom you do not control." Nelson Lund,
The Past and Future of the Individual's Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV.
1, 6 (1996). Lund describes the ownership and use of guns by an array
of notable opponents of gun possession for self-defense: Former Chief
Justice Warren Burger "had been known to answer a knock at his door
by appearing with. a gun in his hand"; Senator Edward Kennedy's "pri-
vate bodyguard was charged with carrying illegal weapons" in Washing-
ton, D.C.; Columnist Carl Rowan "was prosecuted for using an unregis-
tered pistol to gun down a teenager who trespassed in his backyard
swimming pool"; Dr. Joyce Brothers's "husband was one of a privileged
few New York City residents to possess a license ... to own a hand-
gun." Id. at 4-5.
5 The National Abortion Rights Action League.
6 The National Rifle Association.
7 In the nature of their political allegiances with the major parties,
the two groups seem to reflect extreme ends of the political spectrum.
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Democratic Politics and Gun Control, 1 RE-
CONSTRUCTION 137, 138-39 (1992); Dana Milbank, Gun-Control Issues in
Illinois Campaign May Hurt GOP Candidate for Senate, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 4, 1996, at A14.
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parallels between arguments supporting a constitutional right
to abortion and arguments supporting a right to possess indi-
vidual firearms for self-defense. Answering critics and address-
ing their own dissatisfaction with the conceptual foundation on
which the Supreme Court has set the abortion right, commen-
tators have offered alternative and improved theoretical foun-
dations for a fundamental right to abortion. Many of these ef-
forts are grounded on concepts that dovetail eerily and ironi-
cally with those of gun-rights commentators and theorists.
From direct self-defense analogies to accounts responding to
social and political failure, these projects are the primary
guideposts that I will employ to trace the intersection between
conceptions of abortion and gun rights.
Broadly speaking, the core theme of the two movements is
the same: private choice in making life's most critical and piv-
otal decisions. Moreover, there turns out to be a considerable
congruence of rhetoric, political strategy, and regulatory pro-
posals from the groups that oppose individual decision making
on these issues.
This is ironic because these two issues are often viewed as
occupying opposite positions in the political spectrum. That
they are truly so far apart is by no means clear. I can find no
poll which has ever surveyed what gun owners think of abor-
tion or what abortion-rights supporters think of gun owner-
ship.8 But certainly in gross political terms the "standard posi-
8 Gun ownership polls reveal that approximately 50% of American
households contain firearms. See John T. Whitehead & Robert H.
Langworthy, Gun Ownership and Willingness to Shoot: A Clarification of
Current Controversies, 6 JUST. Q. 263, 273 (1989) (using information from
a 1982 ABC News poll to determine the effects of specific variables on
the willingness of a gun owner to shoot). See generally GARY KLECK,
POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 18 (1991) (citing
various surveys conducted between 1959 and 1990 which asked gun own-
ership questions). As might be expected from so large a proportion of
households, many have attitudes that are generally deemed 'liberal"; but
'liberals" who own guns report that they are willing to use them if nec-
essary to repel criminal attack. See generally Whitehead & Langworthy,
supra, at 273 (finding that liberalism does not significantly affect an
individual's willingness to shoot). Professor Kleck notes that "[glun owner-
ship is higher among middle-aged people than in other age groups, pre-
sumably reflecting higher income levels and the sheer accumulation of
property over time." KLECK, supra, at 22. "Gun owners are not, as a
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tion" of the left, reflected for example by the stance of the
Clinton Administration, defends the abortion choice but gener-
ally condemns private gun ownership.9
I do not contend that the conceptual overlap between abor-
tion rights and gun rights is complete. There are abortion-
rights theories that do not intersect with gun-rights argu-
ments.1 ° Moreover, one large aspect of the gun-rights debate
is of minor importance here-arguments about the collective
political value of a citizens' militia, its proper configuration
and constitutional pedigree are largely outside the intersection.
The gun right that intersects abortion-rights theories is the
"right" to own and use a gun for individual self-defense.'1
Armed resistance against criminal attack is the "model case"
that the right addresses.
group . . . more racist, sexist, or violence-prone than nonowners." Id. at
47.
' The Clinton Administration has been a staunch supporter of abor-
tion rights. See Melinda Henneberger, House Votes to Override Clinton's
Veto of Abortion Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 20, 1996, at A22. The President
took a significant political risk in vetoing a measure that would have
banned a category of late-term, or "partial-birth," abortions. See id. In
contrast, cataloguing the "grim madness of our times," Department of
Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala condemns "the
madness of families keeping loaded guns in the .bedroom or hallway clos-
et." Henry J. Reske, Seeking Gun Silence, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at 86.
President Clinton has acknowledged that he is not advocating a ban on
handguns because he does not "think the American people are there
right now." Jann S. Wenner & William Greider, The Rolling Stone Inter-
view: President Clinton, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 9, 1993, at 40, 45.
'0 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amend-
ment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480 (1990) (arguing that to
force pregnant women to give birth would place them in a servant caste,
thus violating their Thirteenth Amendment rights).
'1 Compare Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 1569, 1611 (1979), with Lund, supra note 4, at 6 (using the self-
defense rationale for both abortion and gun-rights arguments). In contrast
to the abortion right, the gun right is controversial partly because of the
Supreme Court's failure to address its status. The last Supreme Court
decision directly addressing the Second Amendment was United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1939). The Court's conclusion in Miller that
the Second Amendment protects the possession of militia weapons and its
recognition that the militia consists of individuals bearing their own
private arms allows widely divergent views of the amendment's scope.
See id. at 178-79.
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My aim in tracking this unlikely congruence of ideas is to
uncover conceptual common ground, not to fulminate about
hypocrisy. But I also have a political point to make. That point
is the crucial importance of unwavering consistency for those
who call upon public officials to honor controversial rights and
call upon the populace generally to respect a contested sphere
of private choice. It is crucial that such advocates respect the
range of choices that are fairly within the boundaries of the
theories they espouse. It will be ruinous to such advocacy if it
seems that its theorists are advocating tolerance merely for a
choice they personally value, to the exclusion of other choices
that their own theories support.
Former ACLU national board member Alan Dershowitz, who
admits that he "hates" guns and wishes to see the Second Am-
endment repealed, nevertheless warns:
Foolish liberals who are trying to read the Second Amend-
ment out of the Constitution by claiming it's not an individu-
al right or that it's too much of a public safety hazard don't
see the danger in the big picture. They're courting disaster by
encouraging others to use the same means to eliminate por-
tions of the Constitution they don't like.'2
All this said, the intersection between abortion rights and
gun rights might not necessarily render the standard position
incoherent. Commentators and supporters who embrace formu-
lations of abortion rights that fall within the intersection, and
still operate from the standard position, might articulate some
principled basis for their disparate treatment of the two
rights.'3 But that work is yet to be done.
Part I begins with a critique of explicit self-defense analogies
supporting the abortion right. Part II examines a cluster of
theories that ground the abortion right on renditions of autono-
my and self-determination that provide equal or stronger justi-
fications for armed self-defense. Part III focuses on one writer's
2 Dan Gifford, The Conceptual Foundations of Anglo-American Juris-
prudence in Religion and Reason; 62 TENN. L. REv. 759, 789 (1985)
(quoting a telephone interview with Alan Dershowitz, Law Professor at
Harvard University (May 3-4, 1994)).
13 In Part IV, infra, I suggest several points that might be part of
that work.
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attempt to form a textual hook for the abortion right using
arguments that offer equal or stronger support for armed self-
defense. Part IV employs the communitarian pairing of abor-
tion and gun rights to underscore their intersection and gauge
their relative claims as fundamental rights. Part V presents an
array of congruencies between the positions opposing the two
rights. Part VI examines the apparent political gulf between
abortion rights and gun rights and lays some of the ground-
work for future efforts to reconcile this political division with
the conceptual intersection of the two rights.
I. EXPLICIT SELF-DEFENSE ANALOGIES SUPPORTING ABORTION
RIGHTS
The suggestion that there is a noteworthy intersection be-
tween conceptions of abortion rights and gun rights is support-
ed directly by efforts to provide alternative or stronger theoret-
ical foundations for the right to abortion. The theme of private
choice in personal crisis has prompted analogies between the
newly established abortion right and the traditionally protect-
ed choice of self-defense. These analogies are explicit in two
early works that Cass Sunstein contends underpin the stron-
gest current justification for the abortion right.14
1. "Re-writing Roe v. Wade"
Donald Regan's attempt to provide a more satisfying justifi-
cation for Roe v. Wade15 grounds the abortion right explicitly
on self-defense principles. 6 Regan first analogizes abortion
rights to samaritan law.'" He offers the self-defense analogy
14 See Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality In Constitutional Law (With
Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 31 n.120 (1994). Sunstein focuses mainly on sexual inequality
issues and the bad-samaritan analogy. See id. at 32. In the first effort
that Sunstein discusses,. Donald Regan draws a clear line between the
self-defense and the bad-samaritan analysis. See Regan, supra note 11, at
1611. In the second, Judith Thomson joins the samaritan and self-defense
themes. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 47, 53 (1971).
1410 U.S. 113 (1972).
10 See Regan, supra note 11.
17 See id. at 1569-70.
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for those who "cannot bring themselves to view removing a
fetus from a woman's body as an omission for purposes of the
bad-samaritan principle."
1 8
Regan presents the abortion choice in the context of a spec-
trum of scenarios where self-defense is permissible: self-de-
fense against a willful criminal attacker, an insane attacker, a
convulsive epileptic swinging a cleaver in a small cabin, and
self-defense by a boat-wreck survivor against a delirious com-
panion who tries to drown him. 9 Regan anchors this line
with a prohibited act of self-preservation-the potential victim
who uses another innocent as a shield against a fatal blow.2°
According to Regan, abortion choice fits somewhere between
self-defense against the epileptic cleaver swinger and the wron-
gful use of an innocent person as a shield.2
Regan concedes that justifying abortion as self-defense is
much more difficult than tolerating self-defense against a will-
ful criminal attacker: "How does one answer the suggestion
that, provided the mother's life is not at stake, the privilege of
self-defense is lost because abortion involves excessive
force?"22 Regan responds that the Model Penal Code permits
deadly force to avoid "death, serious bodily harm, rape or kid-
napping."23 "The burdens of pregnancy and childbirth can be
assimilated either to serious bodily harm or to rape., 24 Abor-
tion defends against serious bodily harm because "pregnancy is
a protracted impairment of function of [a woman's] body as a
whole."25
Sharpening this argument, Regan endorses a dramatic and
illuminating expansion of self-defense. He notes that the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts includes an example that "strongly
18 Id. at 1611. Regan defines the bad-samaritan as one who declines
to give aid to another in need. See id. at 1574.
19 See id. at 1611-12.
20 See id. at 1611.
21 See id. at 1611-12 (arguing that while the fetus is unlike a vio-
lent, insane attacker or a person in convulsions brandishing a cleaver, it
is also unlike an uninvolved bystander).
22 Id. at 1613.
23 Id. at 1613 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962)).
24 id.
25 Id. at 1614.
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implies that a broken arm is serious bodily harm."26 Abortion
does not involve excessive force because "a broken arm and
pregnancy involve similar interferences with normal physical
activity."27 The objection that the burdens of pregnancy do not
justify deadly force because "the force used to repel an attack
must always be proportionate to the harm threatened" ignores
the fact that our law tends to divide harms into two categories:
death or serious bodily harm and less than death or serious
bodily harm.28
Whatever some people might like, our law does not take the
position that death is in a class by itself. Unquestionably one
can kill in self-defense in order to avoid some harms less
than death. Surely one can kill to avoid being made a quadri-
plegic. Surely one can kill to avoid being made a paraplegic.
Surely one can kill to avoid being blinded.29
The parallel between Regan's analysis and the argument for
armed self-defense is illuminating. The first and obvious point
is reflected in Regan's own acknowledgement that abortion is
less like self-defense against a willful attacker and more like
using deadly force against the epileptic cleaver swinger.3 0 By
this measure, the case for armed self-defense is stronger than
the case for abortion choice. Resistance against willful criminal
attack is the "model case" on which the "right" to armed self-
defense is grounded. Herbert Weschler's classic account shows
that self-defense derives from "the [then] universal judgment
26 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 (1965)). Regan
notes that although the broken arm illustration in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts was not drafted with the intention of defining serious bodi-
ly harm, it nevertheless "appears in connection with the basic section on
the use of deadly force in self-defense." Id.
27 Id. at 1615. Regan concedes that he still must answer the argu-
ment that pregnancy is not an impairment because "pregnancy is 'normal'
while a broken arm is not." Id. He responds that to say pregnancy is
normal "is not to say that it imposes no costs." Id.
28 See id.
29 Id. (citation omitted). Finally Regan emphasizes that serious bodily
injury exists only where there is significant risk of death. See id. He
points out that serious bodily injury under both the Model Penal Code
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts requires "either substantial risk of
death or protracted loss of an important physical function." Id. at 1616.
30 See id. at 1611-12.
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that there is no social interest in preserving the lives of ag-
gressors at the cost of those of their victims."3 While there
are varying degrees of controversy over its effectiveness, 3 2 its
constitutional pedigree, and its role in civilized society,3 few
dispute that individual self-defense is at the core of the con-
temporary gun-rights debate.34
The act of self-defense on which Regan's analogy re-
lies-lethal self-defense against the harm of a broken
31 Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of
Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 736 (1937).
32 See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., The Value of Civilian Handgun Pos-
session as Deterrent to Crime or a Defense Against Crime, 18 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 113, 113-14 (1991) (evaluating the proposition that civilian gun
ownership reduces crime); Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to
Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 150-52 (1995) (examining defensive gun
use and victimization); John R. Lott, Jr., & David B. Mustard, Crime,
Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 5 (1997) (discussing the effect of "shall issue" right-to-carry concealed
handgun laws); David McDowall & Colin Loftin, Collective Security and
the Demand for Legal Handguns, 88 AM. J. Soc. 1146, 1158 (1983) (ar-
guing that gun control costs rise in proportion with the collective insecu-
rity of a community); David McDowall et al., Easing Concealed Firearms
Laws: Effects on Homicide in Three States, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLO-
GY 193, 194 (1995) (examining the frequency of homicides in the urban
areas of three states after enacting "shall issue" concealed weapons laws);
David McDowall et al., General Deterrence Through Civilian Gun Owner-
ship: An Evaluation of the Quasi-Experimental Evidence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY
541, 541-42 (1991) (studying the effect that media attention has had on
defensive gun use and reported crimes); Daniel D. Polsby, Reflections on
Violence, Guns, and the Defensive Use of Lethal Force, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1986, at 89, 96-97; Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Tribute to a
View I Have Opposed, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 188, 188 (1995)
(conceding that arguments put forth by gun-rights commentators are
persuasive).
" See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Bigotry, Symbolism and Ideology in
the Battle Over Gun Control, 1992 PUB. INTEREST L. REV. 31, 31-33
(1992) (discussing the moral and public policy arguments in the gun
control debate), William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the
Personal Right to Arms, 43 DuKE L.J. 1236, 1243-44 (1944) (interpreting
the Second Amendment as conferring a private right to bear arms).
' See, e.g., David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen
Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 588 (1991)
("The central issue in gun ownership for contemporary America is person-
al protection.").
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arm 3 -is much more problematic. When viewed in the gun-
rights context, it is likely to generate strong objections. Implic-
it in many gun control arguments is the notion that one should
not resist a criminal attack.36 In common with other anti-gun
organizations, Handgun Control, Inc. ("HCI"), advises victims
of criminal attack to submit rather than physically resist:
"[Tihe best defense against injury is to put up no defense-give
them what they want, or run."37 Under this view, submission
resulting in merely a broken arm for the victim seems prefera-
ble to the hazards of armed resistance. Ironically, operating
from the standard position, one might embrace both Regan's
and HCI's arguments without perceiving the tension between
them.
The armed self-defender aims to avoid the precise harms
that form Regan's analogical foundation. Regan's burden, on
31 See Regan, supra note 11, at 1614-15.
36 See, e.g., PETE SHIELDS, GUNs DON'T DIE-PEOPLE Do 125 (1981)
(writing as Chairman of Handgun Control, Inc.).
37 See SHIELDS, supra note 36, at 125. This advice leaves open the
question, what if they want me dead, raped or maimed? Shields's advice
reflects a particular bias that is problematic and even offensive to many
people.
His advice reflects the threat expectations and resistance dynamic
of men-arguably, affluent, white men. On the view that one's main
exposure will be property crimes, typically committed by young, poor,
perpetrators, Shields's advice makes very good sense. Who wants the
condemnation and stigma that would follow the shooting of a knife-wield-
ing kid from the ghetto over fifty dollars and some credit cards?
From the perspective of a woman, or a husband or father who
thinks seriously about potential threats to women he loves, the calcula-
tion changes dramatically. It is certainly debatable whether the Central
Park jogger would have been better off having had, and used, a gun in
self-defense rather than giving her assailants what they wanted.
The threat calculation is also different for individuals whose differ-
ences make them targets, e.g., someone who is the "wrong" color in the
wrong place, interracial couples who might be the "wrong" combination
many places, openly gay or lesbian individuals or couples in many places
in America.
Many people who fall into any of these categories might easily find
the blind spot in the HCI threat model elitist, insensitive or flatly offen-
sive. To the degree that the HCI threat model influences legislation and
policy, it is dangerous. That it is unreflectively endorsed by public repre-
sentatives of groups whose threat models it ignores, is baffling.
106 [Vol.50:97
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the other hand, is to equate the rigors of pregnancy and child-
birth to the harms that trigger the right of self-defense. Regan
travels much of the same path taken by those who wish to
preserve for individuals the opportunity to use guns for the
core self-defense purposes identified by the Model Penal
Code,38 but ultimately he must cut deep into territory that
one need not explore to sustain the gun right.
Regan acknowledges that the innocence of the fetus creates
wrinkles in his self-defense analogy.3" The law imposes a duty
to retreat where the attacker is innocent or where the "victim"
has provoked the attack.4 ° Regan answers that while a preg-
nant woman generally has done "something which made her
pregnancy more likely," in cases where she has used contracep-
tion, she has not "invited" attack by the fetus."
The gun right avoids this wrinkle. In the model case, the
victim may not invite or provoke the attack. If she does, the
self-defense claim generally fails.42
At another stage of the comparison, however, the gun right
faces more difficulty. Regan contends that abortion is an essen-
tial liberty because it is the only remedy that will save the
woman from the harms of pregnancy and child birth.43 That
claim is harder to make for the gun-user, who might have a
number of alternatives to armed self-defense. This allows two
general points.
First, it invites the observation that passive avoidance mea-
sures such as locking doors and avoiding "dangerous" places
are to the gun argument as abstinence or contraception are to
the abortion argument. Avoidance responses, like more police
and better locks," are non-responsive to the problem that the
38 See Regan, supra note 11, at 1613-14; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.01-
.04 (Official Draft 1962).
39 See Regan, supra note 11, at 1612; see also infra Part IV.
40 See Regan, supra note 11, at 1612 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 63 cmt. b (1965)).
41 See id.
42 See id. (acknowledging the failure of the self-defense claim where
the "victim" has provoked the violence).
43 See id. at 1613 ("The woman cannot be spared the burdens of
pregnancy without killing the fetus").
4 It is debatable whether calling the police is properly within the
category of avoidance strategies. There is a significant difference between
19971
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gun right addresses-viz., what happens where avoidance
mechanisms have failed. A woman facing an unwanted preg-
nancy will find exhortations to celibacy or contraception equal-
ly non-responsive.
Second, it highlights the objection that self-defense and
armed self-defense are different. I deal with this objection in
detail in Part IV, drawing upon responses to similar objections
of over-inclusiveness in the abortion debate. Also I argue there,
as I have elsewhere,45 that the objection does not take self-
defense against deadly threats seriously. As governmental
choices of defense tools show, guns are unparalleled instru-
ments of self-defense.4" Moreover, empirical work shows the
gun's deterrent/threat value (its capacity to stop aggression
without being fired) is unmatched.47 The alternative of con-
tact weapons would sacrifice this deterrent value and effec-
tively deny self-defense to physically weaker or outnumbered
people who may need it most.48
Regan's last analogy is between unwanted pregnancy and
rape.4 9 He concedes that a significant barrier to the rape an-
alogy is the innocence of the fetus.5 ° To account for this,
Regan employs a hypothetical "innocent rapist" and then advo-
cates a right to self-defense against him. 1 In this comparison,
passive measures like locks or barred windows, and defensive violence
delegated to police. As I will argue in Part V, Section F, there is very
little moral distinction between self-defense and the delegation of defen-
sive violence to police. See also Kates, supra note 32, at 120 (arguing
that if it is immoral to use deadly force in self-defense it is equally im-
moral to delegate that task to others).
" See Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Indi-
vidual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 37-53 (1992).
46 See Kleck & Gertz, supra note 32, at 151-52.
47 See, e.g., id.
4' For more detailed treatment of this issue, see infra Part VI.
41 See Regan, supra note 11, at 1616. Regan acknowledges that there
are differences between unwanted pregnancy and rape that make the
comparison imprecise, but he contends they are differences in degree
rather than kind. See id. The statistical risk of death from rape is great-
er. Arguably the intrinsic horror of rape is greater. However, Regan
argues that there is surely an element of horror to an unwanted preg-
nancy. See id. at 1617.
'o See id. at 1616-17.
5' See id. at 1617. He posits a woman being raped by a man she
[V01.50:97
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Regan again travels through territory and relies upon points
that support a right of armed self-defense against a willful
criminal attacker.52 To make the case for abortion rights in
this context, he must move well beyond the "model case" of the
willful criminal attacker to the fantastic example of the "inno-
cent rapist" whose circumstances are closer to the unwanted
fetus.53
Regan acknowledges that the right of self-defense grows
substantially from an asymmetry of claims to physical integri-
ty between the attacker and the victim.54 As Regan shows,
this asymmetry is most severe where the attacker is a criminal
aggressor-the primary concern of those who advocate strong
protection for a right of armed self-defense. Attention to this
asymmetry underscores the comparative weakness of the abor-
tion argument. The armed victim's duty toward her attacker is
significantly diminished by the attacker's aggressive action. As
Regan's analogies show-e.g., the innocent rapist--establishing
that same asymmetry between the mother and the fetus is
much harder.
Regan's analysis has been widely cited.55 His self-defense
arguments are squarely within the intersection of the abortion
and gun rights. This demands reflection by those who find
Regan convincing but who also adopt the standard position.
knows is suffering from an insane delusion that she is his wife who en-
joys resisting and being taken by force. The man's only delusion is about
the identity of the woman he is attacking. Regan speculates that if such
a case arose, "a privilege to use deadly force would be found." Id.
But it might be thought that the rape is different; that the injury
from rape depends more on the hostility of the attacker. It might there-
fore be argued that deadly force cannot be used on the innocent rapist,
or, by extension, on the fetus.
52 See id. at 1617-18. For a discussion of a woman's right to use
deadly force to repel rape, see Don B. Kates & Nancy J. Engberg, Dead-
ly Force Self-Defense Against Rape, 15 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 873 (1982).
51 See Regan, supra note 11, at 1617.
See id. at 1618.
5 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 383 n.61
(1985) (Justice Ginsburg, at the time, was a Judge on the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 31 n.120.
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2. Self-Defense Against the Fetus as Person
Judith Thomson uses the self-defense analogy to support
abortion choice as a matter of moral philosophy.56 Thomson
intentionally surrenders much of the contested ground in the
abortion debate, granting for the sake of argument that the
fetus is a person at conception. Through a series of analogies
she shows that it is a long and uncertain journey from there to
strict prohibition of abortion.57
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back
in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious
violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment,
and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the avail-
able medical records and found that you alone have the right
blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and
last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into
yours .... To unplug you would be to kill him....
[Riemember .... all persons have a right to life, and violin-
ists are persons."
Thomson argues that one's natural outrage as the victim of
this arrangement helps illustrate the distance between a decla-
ration that the fetus is a person and a prohibition on abortion.
Like Regan, Thomson builds her case for abortion rights on
themes that more easily support armed self-defense. The view
that we may not intervene, even to save the life of the moth-
er59 falls to her argument that the mother surely would have
56 See Thomson, supra note 14, at 52-53. Jane Cohen calls this
Thomson's "justly famous essay." Jane Maslow Cohen, Comparative Shop-
ping in the Marketplace of Rights, 98 YALE L.J. 1235, 1235 (1989).
" See Thomson, supra note 14, at 48. She presumes as the argu-
ment against abortion that:
Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life.
No doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in
and to her body .... But surely a person's right to life is
stronger and more stringent than the mother's right to decide
what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it.
Id.
58 Id. at 48-50.
5 On this view the fetus is a person, and taking the life of a person
is always murder and always wrong. See id. at 50.
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a right to abort, where the fetus was threatening her life.6"
Thomson takes the point further with an analogy that is
illuminating in its content and tone. She posits the case of a
mother trapped in a very small house with a rapidly growing
child.6' The child is growing at such a rate that it soon will
crush the mother against the walls of the house.62 Thomson
presses the self-defense point in rhetoric that is instructive.
Under these circumstances, she insists, "it cannot be concluded
that [the woman] can do nothing, that you cannot attack it to
save your life." 3
There is a notable dissonance between this rhetoric and the
emotions that typically accompany parenthood, even in cases
where the child is unplanned. Thomson's suggestion of a "right
to attack" the life-threatening child does not seem to capture
the decision faced by the mother whose life is threatened by a
problem pregnancy. Thomson's account connotes indignation
about having been assaulted. This certainly resonates in the
context of armed self-defense against a criminal attack. But is
it accurate to say that women who choose abortion think of
themselves as attacking the fetus? The scenario Thomson pos-
es, seems more a "tragic choice"64 between conflicting virtues
than a violent contest where a victim resists and triumphs
over a wrongful aggressor.
The dissonance grows as Thomson layers the analogy with
the further indignation of the woman being crushed to death in
her own home.65 Knowing that the woman owns the house,
she contends, compels a bystander to choose between the wom-
an and the child.66 It is not mere impartiality to say that we
cannot choose between the two. 7
60 See id. at 52.
61 See id.
62 See id.
s Id. (emphasis added).
Guido Calibresi coined the term "tragic choice" to connote legal
choices allocating great burdens where "basic ideals are in irreconcilable
conflict." Guido Calibresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REV.
427, 428 (1979).
65 See Thomson, supra note 14, at 52.
66 See id. at 53.
67 See id.
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[Tihe mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants
in a small house which has, by an unfortunate mistake, been
rented to both: the mother owns the house. The fact that she
does adds to the offensiveness of deducing that the mother
can do nothing from the supposition that third parties can do
nothing. But it does more than this: it casts a bright light on
the supposition that third parties can do nothing. Certainly it
lets us see that a third party who says "I cannot choose be-
tween you" is fooling himself if he thinks this is impartiality.
If Jones has found and fastened on a certain coat, which he
needs to keep him from freezing, but which Smith also needs
to keep from freezing, then it is not impartiality that says "I
cannot choose between you" when Smith owns the coat. Wom-
en have said again and again "[tihis body is my body!" and
they have reason to feel angry, reason to feel that it has been
like shouting into the wind.68
The dissonance is clearer here. Thomson's relation of the
woman's anger seems misplaced. While anger easily might be
directed toward social and legal structures that complicate an
already tragic choice, it is harder to imagine the woman feeling
toward the fetus the type of anger that Thomson describes. It
is much easier to understand this type of anger directed at the
criminal aggressor who forces a victim to shoot in self-defense.
This illustrates in a different way that the themes Thomson
employs support armed self-defense more easily than they do
the abortion right.69
Thomson's next analogy parallels the case of the fetus who is
not a threat to the life of the mother. The equivalent, she sug-
gests, is again our kidnapping victim, who this time learns
that she can save the life of the violinist merely by staying
connected to him for an hour.70 Thomson argues that while it
would be indecent for one to refuse the violinist under these
68 id.
69 Thomson also acknowledges that in the case of voluntary pregnan-
cy the self-defense analogy breaks down. See id. at 58. Where the woman
"voluntarily called [the fetus] into existence, how can she now kill it,
even in self-defense?" Id. She answers that voluntariness establishes at
most that there are some cases in which abortion is unjust killing. See
id. at 59. It does not establish that all abortion is unjust killing. See id.
70 See id. at 59.
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circumstances, that does not translate into a right of the vio-
linist to demand assistance.71 She argues that laws prohibit-
ing abortion require the mother to act as a good samaritan for
the benefit of the fetus, in a way that is vastly inconsistent
with our general views of when one is compelled to give assis-
tance to save the life of another. 2 She finishes with a point
that is important here: "[Tihe groups currently working
against liberalization of abortion laws, in fact working toward
having it declared unconstitutional for a state to permit abor-
tion, had better start working for the adoption of Good Samari-
tan laws generally, or earn the charge that they are acting in
bad faith. 7
3
Thomson's suggestion that abortion restrictions put a unique
burden on women to act as samaritans-made more forcefully
as an equal protection argument-is according to Cass
Sunstein, one of the strongest theoretical justifications for the
abortion right.7'4 Her challenge invites a similar one to com-
mentators who ground the abortion right on self-defense prin-
ciples but still embrace the standard position. I do not argue
that inconsistency on these issues necessarily earns the charge
that people are acting in bad faith. As I indicate in Part VI,
reconciliation might be possible.
Within the samaritan critique, the armed citizen can raise
strong objections that parallel Thomson's points on abortion.
Perhaps a splendid samaritan would undertake to assist a
small, but widely distributed and unidentified group of puta-
tive victims by sacrificing her personal firearm (on the view
71 See id.
72 See id. at 63.
13 Id. at 63-64.
7" Cass Sunstein suggests a growing consensus among legal theorists
that this argument is the best conceptual foundation for the abortion
right. See Sunstein, supra note 14, 31 n.120. See also text accompanying
notes 119, 120, 149.
On this view, abortion restrictions improperly require women to act
as samaritans, because the same thing is not demanded of men. In fact,
this is only true of fertile, post-pubescent, pre-menopausal women. It is
not then strictly sex discrimination, but a burden that attaches to a
particular biological characteristic. But see Ginsburg, supra note 55, at
382 (arguing that abortion restrictions are not merely conditions relevant
to biological characteristics, because gender is a social construction).
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that her gun might fall into the wrong hands and be used
criminally against one of them).,5 But given the relative du-
ties of the right bearers (the woman toward the fetus and the
armed citizen toward other citizens generally), forcing such an
obligation by banning defensive firearms would be a greater
imposition of samaritan duty than occurs in the abortion con-
text.
Finally, Thomson deals with the objection that her argument
misses the point: that it is not merely a view of the fetus as a
person that fuels opposition to abortion, but also the responsi-
bility of the parents to the fetus.v6 Thomson responds that the
parents have no such special responsibility until the child is
born and they make the affirmative decision to take it
home.77 She seems to be alone on this view of parental res-
ponsibility.
Notwithstanding Thomson's view it is clear that parental
responsibility, the causal link between actions of the parents
and the plight of the fetus are central to the self-defense analo-
gies that she draws upon. This is apparent from Donald
Regan's discussion above, explaining that the self-defender
may not use lethal violence where she has "caused" the con-
frontation in the first place."
" The samaritan argument also might yield the opposite conclusion.
The citizen who eschews gun ownership might significantly diminish her
ability to protect another who is encountering a violent assault. Cf
George P. Fletcher, Defensive Force as an Act of Rescue, SOC. PHIL. &
POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 174 (analyzing the Talmudic duty of rescuing
one's neighbors from catastrophic danger, particularly in the case of
rape).
76 See Thomson, supra note 14, at 64.
77 See id. at 65. Thomson argues that:
[We do not have any such "special responsibility" for a person
unless we have assumed it, explicitly or implicitly. If a set of
parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abor-
tion, and then at the time of birth of the child do not put it out
for adoption, but rather take it home with them, then they have
assumed responsibility for it . . ..
Id.
71 See Regan, supra note 11, at 1612. Donald Regan, who uses both
the samaritan and self-defense analogies in support of abortion choice,
would impose parental responsibility for the fetus earlier. Regan contends
that the samaritan analogy sustains the Roe trimester approach since
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For our purposes, the relative responsibility of the right-
bearers helps to order the two liberties. As discussed in detail
in Part IV, the parents have a greater responsibility for the
fetus than does the armed victim for the criminal attacker in
the "model case."79 In this context, the gun-rights claim is
stronger.
II. SOCIAL FAILURE, AUTONOMY, PERSONAL CRISIS, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: PRIVATE CHOICE IN PIVOTAL LIFE
DECISIONS
An array of formulations draw upon principles of autonomy,
choice in personal crisis, social failure and physical integrity,
to advance conceptions of essential liberty that support the
abortion right. These themes coalesce roughly in the Supreme
Court's latest abortion-rights decision, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.8" These same themes support equally, and often more
powerfully, a right to armed self-defense against criminal at-
tack.8' Indeed, the Casey decision is explicit in the suggestion
that the abortion right rests on a foundation of fundamental
rights that includes an individual right to arms. Sections A
through D discuss the themes that have emerged in the abor-
tion-rights literature and the intersection of these themes with
gun-rights arguments. Section E discusses Casey.
"the woman who allows her pregnancy to reach the third trimester with-
out having an abortion ... has waived her right of non-involvement
with the fetus." Id. at 1643.
" Parental responsibility is central to the communitarian critique of
abortion and the communitarian pairing of abortion and gun rights that
is discussed in Part IV.
80 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
81 The same broad theme has fueled arguments that the foundation
of the abortion right also supports a constitutional right to assisted sui-
cide. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral
Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REV. 857, 888 (1992); Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy
and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CoRNELL L. REV. 490, 496 (1992)
(suggesting a "deep symmetry" between the right to abortion and the
right to die). But see, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-
Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey, and The Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L.
REV. 803, 837 (1995).
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A. Grounding Rights on Social Failures: A Modified
Rawlsian Account
Robin West offers a general conception of'rights that might
provide a stronger justification for abortion rights.82 She calls
her formulation a "modified Rawlsian" account: "To whatever
degree we fail to create the minimal conditions for a just soci-
ety, we also have a right, individually and fundamentally, to
be shielded from the most dire or simply the most damaging
consequences of that failure."" By West's account, a just soci-
ety must have more than the qualities described by Rawls.
[A] just society is a society in which being a mother with at-
tached, connected, or simply dependent children, does not un-
duly burden participatory citizenship. Indeed, I would take
this insight further: A just society is one in which "connected
relationality"-whether through motherhood, fatherhood,
sisterhood, brotherhood, intimacy, friendship, or whatev-
er-not only does not unduly burden participatory citizen-
ship, but is central to our conception of participatory citizen-
ship. Such a world would be more just than the world we
presently inhabit. It would also be a very different world; it
would require not only a displacement, but a transformation
of our prevailing norms of citizenship.
In the meantime, we have a right, I would argue, to be
shielded from the harshest consequences of our failure to se-
cure such a world. The abortion right partakes of this second-
best, residual, transitional form. We must have the right to
opt out of an unjust patriarchal world that visits unequal but
unparalleled harms upon women with wanted and celebrated
children, and even more serious harms upon women with un-
wanted pregnancies.'
The question for our purposes is whether it is fair to exclude
from this account, a woman's choice of armed self-defense
against assault, rape or the "grim world of terror abuse and
violence" that radical feminists have argued is the reality for
many women in the private sphere.85 To the extent that wom-
82 See generally Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abor-
tion, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 961 (1994).
83 Id. at 964-65.
' Id. at 965.
85 See id. at 963.
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en voluntarily participate in the act that leads to an unwanted
fetus,86 the abortion right responds to a less obvious societal
failure. Arguably, the greater failure is where women cannot
feel safe from physical assault away from or in their homes.
West's principle extends not just to women. It is a solid
foundation for a right to armed self-defense for all citizens in a
society where physical assault is a real danger and where
collective measures to address the problem are demonstrably
inadequate.87 Gary Kleck confirms, empirically, what should
be obvious: "police primarily respond reactively to crimes after
they have occurred .... Police officers rarely disrupt violent
crimes or burglaries in progress .... ,8 Moreover, police have
no legal duty to protect individual citizens.89 With collective
mechanisms structurally inadequate, armed self-defense re-
86 But see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED 46-62 (1987) (describing women's role as passive objects
in society); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe
v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 43, 95 (1987) (suggesting that women
feel compelled to encourage male initiative in sexual expression); Linda
C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 428-29
(1996) (arguing that most female adolescent sexual activity results from
abuse, exploitation, coercion and aggression).
87 The conception of rights that West advances rings similar to
Blackstone's view of the right to possess arms for self-defense. "The fifth
and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is
that of having arms for their defense .... when the sanctions of society
and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression." 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143-44 (citation omitted).
There is, however, a notable difference. West's conception establishes
abortion as a transitional right, pending transformation of our patriarchal
society. See West, supra note 82, at 965. Blackstone appears to base his
right to armed self-defense on the premise that the societal safety net
against physical threats might fail from time to time. See BLACKSTONE,
supra, at *144. West seems to believe that the eradication of patriarchy
would be necessarily permanent. See West, supra note 82, at 965.
8 KLECK, supra note 8, at 121.
89 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 195 (1989); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.
1982); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C. 1981); see also
Kates, supra note 32, at 123-24 (citing cases and statutes). But see
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527-28 (D. Conn.
1984) (holding that plaintiff who alleged that a municipal police depart-
ment policy of non-intervention in domestic disputes discriminated against
women as a class stated a valid cause of action).
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sponds to a more direct and serious failure than the one West
contends sustains the abortion right.
This conclusion is strengthened when we measure West's
position against both the traditional theoretical justification for
self-defense and Rawlsian arguments for expansion of self-
defense in battered women cases.9 °
Social/political failure or incompetency (viz., the inability of
collective mechanisms to respond to an imminent violent
threat) are core rationales for our traditional right of self-de-
fense.9' The state's inability to stop imminent criminal at-
tacks justifies, and indeed compels, a right to armed self-de-
fense to fill the gap.92
[Tihe imminence requirement expresses the limits of govern-
mental competence: when the danger to a protected interest
is imminent and unavoidable, the legislature can no longer
make reliable judgements about which of the conflicting in-
terests should prevail. Similarly, when an attack against
private individuals is imminent, the police are no longer in a
position to intervene and exercise the state's function of secur-
ing public safety. The individual right to self-defense kicks in
precisely because immediate action is necessary.93
The gun right rests solidly on this inevitable failure. West
grounds the abortion right on a more amorphous deficiency.
Arguing for a broader right of self-defense for battered wom-
en, Ben Zipursky would excuse the imminent threat require-
ment to allow deadly force where the woman has no access in
fact to genuine alternatives.94 He presents State v. Norman95
90 See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination, and the
Social Contract, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 579, 605 (1996). Zipursky's Rawlsian
critique argues that political and societal failure can justify self-defense
by battered women even absent an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily harm. See id.
91 See id. at 585.
92 See id. at 585 & n.17 (quoting George P. Fletcher, Domination in
the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 570
(1996) (discussing allocation of authority where public resources fail and
diminished competency where public resources are absent) (citing GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978))).
13 Id. (emphasis added).
9 See Zipursky, supra note 90, at 583.
15 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1988).
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as the typical "no access" case:
Judy Norman experienced decades of serious physical and
emotional abuse from her husband. She killed [shot] him
while he slept, but he had stated that he would kill her when
he awoke. He had tracked her down on every previous occa-
sion on which she had tried to escape. Her efforts to have
him institutionalized failed and caused here to be more se-
verely abused. The authorities had permitted him to return
home.96
Zipursky argues that from a social contract perspective,
physical, psychological, sexual and political domination of
women is a reason to favor a self-defense rule that does not
require imminence.97 Zipursky builds this idea on Rawls's
"original position,"98 expanding the boundaries of self-defense
in a way that closely tracks West's argument99 that the right
96 Zipursky, supra note 90, at 583. Zipursky notes the objection that
allowing self-defense as an excuse in these cases invites sexist stereo-
types of women as pathetic victims, who should not be held responsible
for their actions. See id. at 580. Feminists have criticized that those
same stereotypes fuel the argument that women ought not possess guns
for self-defense. See Mary Ziess Stange, Arms and the Woman: A Femi-
nist Reappraisal, in GUNS: WHO SHOULD HAVE THEM 15, 20 (David B.
Kopel ed., Prometheus Books 1995).
17 See Zipursky, supra note 90, at 596. Zipursky contends that we
could properly eliminate the imminence requirement in cases where a
woman has no effective access to alternatives--cases in which the assail-
ant would have inflicted grievous bodily harm or death upon the defen-
dant had she not resorted to defensive aggression. See id. at 609. The
lack of an alternative is shown where the woman has tried to leave in
the past but the man has tracked her down, retrieved her, and beat her
again. See id. at 584. She has tried the police, but they have failed to
offer adequate protection, and she has been beaten for seeking protection;
she is economically or psychologically dependent upon the man. See id.
98 See id. at 587 ("[W]hat sort of structure would be chosen by a
rational person selecting a basic structure for society without knowing his
or her wealth, occupation, religion, ideology, race, gender, abilities, dis-
abilities and so on?").
" Zipursky argues that from the original position, rational decision-
makers, calculating the possibility that they might be women when the
veil of ignorance is lifted, could easily select a "no-access" self-defense
rule that eliminated the requirement of imminence. See id. at 594. Those
who know they will be men would not. This illustrates how the no-access
rule is affected by male domination of women. See id. According to
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to choose abortion is essential to redressing the injustices lev-
ied on women under patriarchy.100 Zipursky argues that a
system that prohibits the no-access self-defense justification
cannot ask for the rational allegiance of women.01
The basic failures that leave a battered woman with no
access to real options outside lethal violence are similar to
those that West claims sustain the abortion right. But the
parent's responsibility for the plight of the fetus makes the
battered woman's claim for a compensating self-defense right
stronger.
Compared either to the model case of traditional self-defense
or Zipursky's expanded formulation, the abortion right rests on
a more tenuous connection between societal failure and the fair
demand for a responsive right. As against either the imminent
criminal attacker or the abusive mate in temporary repose, the
fetus is overwhelmingly innocent of responsibility for the crisis.
The parents in the abortion context also have several degrees
more control over the crisis and contribute to it directly
through discretionary acts or even negligence. This does not
bar West's claim for the abortion right, but it does show that
the abortion claim is comparatively weaker under her theory
than is the claim for armed self-defense.
B. "Castle" as a Location of Inviolability, Autonomy, and
Reproductive Freedom
Linda McClain uses the trilogy of "castle, sanctuary and
body" to develop a conception of inviolability that might help
"to secure women's sexual autonomy, to achieve reproductive
autonomy and to eliminate violence against women."0 2 She
presents this trilogy "as familiar location[s] of the law's protec-
Zipursky, the no-access rule thus becomes an essential feature of a just
society, so long as there is domination by men over women. See id. at
596.
100 Similarly, Catharine MacKinnon argues that abortion is an essen-
tial "transitional right." See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1326-27 (1991).
101 See Zipursky, supra note 90, at 596.
102 Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanc-
tuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 196 (1995).
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tion of inviolability." °3 McClain describes this project as only
a first step toward a view of inviolability that will address an
array of concerns women have under patriarchy."° While
McClain warns that she has not completed the connections,-
105 it is useful for our purposes to examine one of her opera-
tive principles and its traditional parameters.
As David Caplan notes, defending the castle/home by force of
arms is a vaunted Anglo-American tradition. 0 6 The Model
Penal Code reflects the castle doctrine by eliminating the duty
to retreat when being attacked in one's own dwelling.' 7 The
castle defense is acknowledged explicitly in feminist self-de-
fense critiques' 8 In an examination of self-defense by bat-
tered women, Richard Rosen notes that "[tihe law almost never
requires retreat in the home-the 'castle' exception-because of
society's recognition of the sanctity of the home." °9 Rosen
gives representative examples of the array of cases in which
the idea of castle enhances the self-defense claim."0
McClain acknowledges this connection but seemingly grudg-
ingly.
One dimension of the idea of the home as castle is the
right of a man or woman to protect the home and persons
within it against intrusion or attack by using force. A dis-
turbing recent example of the misapplication of such a right
involved an acquittal of a homeowner for fatally shooting a
Japanese exchange student who mistakenly approached the
home looking for a party. [The defense lawyer claimed],
103 Id. at 195.
104 See id. at 240.
105 See id.
10" See David I. Caplan, The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A
Recent Judicial Trend, 1982 DEW. C.L. REV. 789, 807, 809.
107 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (2)(b)(ii)(A).
108 See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 14.
109 Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who
Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 390 (1993). Rosen argues that
imminence is merely a translator for necessity; that the battered women's
cases present such necessity and a justification for deadly self-defense,
even absent classic imminence. See id. at 380, 404.
10 See id. at 389 n.51. See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
596 n.44 (1980) (quoting Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.
1603)).
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"[almericans have the absolute legal right to answer everyone
who comes to their door with a gun." In a subsequent civil
trial brought by the student's parents, however, a judge
found "no justification whatsoever" for the killing and award-
ed damages."'
The idea of castle may help to further feminist goals. But
outside certain limited contexts, it seems an uncomfortable one
for feminists. McClain's response to feminist arguments that
privacy jurisprudence is an illusion for women reflects this
point."' She acknowledges the criticism that privacy in the
home and domestic life has benefited men and imperiled
women's bodily integrity and decisional autonomy."' None-
theless, she argues that it is possible to use privacy and invio-
lability in ways that will protect women's interests."'
One might take from this a claim that women can indeed
benefit from the idea of castle-but only if we pursue privacy
values or the notion of inviolability in an aggressive but princi-
pled way. It is unclear, though, how principled use of the idea
of castle to achieve feminist goals would avoid the tradition of
armed self-defense firmly located there. Indeed, concerns about
bodily integrity and protection against violent threats that
partly animate McClain's effort, require serious consideration
of tools and strategies of self-defense.
A right of armed self-defense is deeply embedded in the idea
of castle on which McClain hopes to build. Moreover, the idea
of castle arguably supports armed self-defense more easily
than it supports a right of procreative freedom." 5 At a mini-
mum, procreative autonomy grounded in the idea of the invio-
lable castle must share space with the right of armed self-de-
"' McClain, supra note 102, at 205 n.30 (citations omitted). McClain's
commentary also can be read as a more limited criticism, focusing on the
use of lethal force to protect property. She would acknowledge that de-
fense of the person is a stronger case. See id. at 203.
112 See id.
113 See id. at 209.
114 See id. at 207-11.
115 For one thing, the abortion right often is exercised outside the
home and requires the assistance of a third party who is engaged in a
commercial enterprise. For another, traditional and historical connections
between the idea of castle and armed self-defense are much more firmly
established.
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C. Fundamental Rights and the Essence of Liberty
Susan Estrich and Kathleen Sullivan offer one of the most
comprehensive treatments of the theories and principles that
might support the abortion right."' They contend that abor-
tion is within the range of autonomous choices about matters
of family that the Court has long considered to be central to
privacy."' Elaborating on the rationale for protecting these
choices, they draw upon principles from which we can just as
readily draw a right of armed self-defense.
Liberty, they tell us, "requires independence in making the
most important decisions in life.""' The abortion decision lies
at the heart of protected constitutional choices because "few
decisions can more importantly alter the course of one's life
than the decision to bring a child into the world."" 9 The gun
right thrives under this analysis.
Arguably, no decision has more potential to alter the course
of one's life than one's response to the threat of death or seri-
ous bodily injury. 2 ° The choice of armed self-defense de-
serves equal, if not more, protection than the abortion choice
since the right-bearer's very existence, rather than just the
116 See Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics:
Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 119-55 (1989).
Estrich and Sullivan characterize the article as their "best try, using
whatever legal and persuasive talents we have" to convince Justice
O'Connor to champion the abortion right. Id. at 123. Reflecting this
broad ambition, the article presents not a single theory, but the full
array of arguments in favor of the abortion right. See id. at 119-55.
117 See id. at 130-31.
118 Id. at 127 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 Views on this will be tempered by one's image of the circumstanc-
es in which the threat emerges and its immediacy. In some cases, the
victim has no real choice because the threat is upon her before she can
react. Focusing only on those cases, the comparison breaks down, because
there is no opportunity to "choose" self-defense or anything else.
There is, however, an entire constellation of threats where the vic-
tim has the choice of submitting or fighting back. The empirical findings
of Professor Kleck and others indicate that there are millions of success-
ful acts of armed self-defense each year, most of which do not involve
discharge of a weapon. See KLECK, supra note 8, at 106.
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quality of it, is at stake.
I do not contend that armed resistance to violent threats is
always the right choice. No one makes that claim about abor-
tion either. The point is that each offers an option that can
dramatically affect the course of a life-changing crisis. In many
cases, eliminating the option will have catastrophic effects.12'
Estrich and Sullivan contend that "keeping reproductive
choice in private hands is essential to a free society."'22 "Reg-
imentation of reproduction," they argue, is a "hallmark of the
totalitarian state, from Plato's republic to Hitler's Germa-
ny. .... ,123 "Preserving a private sphere for childbearing and
child-rearing decisions not only liberates the individual; it
desirably constrains the state."'24
From the earliest commentaries to the present, this precise
claim has been made about the Second Amendment. Joseph
Story's 1833 commentary hailed the right of the citizens to
keep and bear arms as "the palladium of the liberties of a
Republic,"'25 adding that "one of the ordinary modes, by
which tyrants accomplish their purpose without resistance, is,
by disarming the people, and making it an offense to keep
arms." 26 An armed citizenry not only serves the private fun-
ction of self-defense. It is a solid constraint on the physical
coercion that Estrich and Sullivan's examples show to be a
basic tool of totalitarian regimes.
127
121 Speaking more broadly, the two choices present what we might
concede are essentially equal concerns. On issues like these, it is proba-
bly impossible to construct a rigid hierarchy by which to rank personal
crises. It is enough to say that to abort a fetus or to use a gun in self-
defense are both horrible choices that individuals will face in times of
deep personal crisis. In both cases, we can say, that not having a choice
is worse.
122 Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 130.
123 Id.
124 Id. (citing Jed Rubenfeld, The Right To Privacy, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 737, 804-07 (1989)).
125 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 746 (Caroli-
na Academic Press 1987) (1883).
126 JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 264 (Harper & Bros. 1883). This is one place where
arguments about the collective political value of an armed citizenry inter-
sects with abortion-rights arguments.
127 Joseph Story's comments suggest that the classically educated
[Vol.50:97
PRINCIPLES AND PASSIONS
Sanford Levinson cautions that it might be painfully short-
sighted to discard the constraint on the state that individual
arms provide. 2 ' William Van Alstyne emphasizes the
Framers' vision of an armed citizenry as a component of the
security of a "free state" which he points out is quite distinct
from the security of "the State."'29 In a study of government
genocides, Jay Simkin, Aaron Zelman and Alan Rice argue
that one hallmark of the totalitarian state is the confiscation of
private firearms. 3 ° Tracking the patterns of genocides over
the past 100 years, they argue that as a practical matter, gov-
ernments cannot commit genocide except on effectively dis-
armed populations.13' Abortion choice as a barrier against to-
Founding Fathers were well acquainted with Aristotle's dictum that basic
to tyrants is "mistrust of the people; hence they deprive them of arms."
ARISTOTLE, POLrrIcS 218 (Betty Radice ed., Thomas Alan Sinclair trans.,
Penguin Books 1962). The Founding Fathers also recognized Aristotle's
teaching that confiscation of the Athenians' personal arms had been in-
strumental to the tyrannies of the Peisistratus and the Thirty. See ARIS-
TOTLE, THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION 47, 105 (H. Rackham trans., Har-
vard University Press 1952).
128 See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99
YALE L.J. 637, 656-57 (1989).
129 See Van Alstyne, supra note 33, at 1244-45.
131 See JAY SIMKIN ET AL., LETHAL LAWS (1995). Don B. Kates, Jr.
and Daniel D. Polsby provide a good summary of the book. See Don B.
Kates, Jr. & Daniel D. Polsby, Of Genocide and Disarmament, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 247, 247-56 (1995) (book review).
131 For instance, had its 1-3 million Cambodian victims been armed,
it is far from clear that a Khmer Rouge army numbering less than
100,000 could have murdered them. At least, the Khmer Rouge doubted
they could have done so. The Cambodians were already largely disarmed,
guns having been prohibited from the time of the French occupation.
Nevertheless, as a prelude to the geno-politicide, the Khmer Rouge took
the extraordinary precaution of a nationwide house-to-house and hut-to-
hut search to assure that the citizenry was indeed helpless. The rationale
the Khmer Rouge gave their victims for disarming is eerily familiar with
the standard position on gun ownership for self-defense. The Khmer
Rouge soldiers would:
knock on the doors and ask the people who answered if they
had any weapons. "We are here now to protect you," the soldiers
said, "and no one has a need for a weapon any more." People
who said that they kept no weapons were forced to stand aside
and allow the soldiers to look for themselves.
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talitarianism is a minor theme for Estrich and Sullivan.
Simkin and company employ the theme to make a much stron-
ger case for the government-constraining effect of privately-
owned firearms. 32
Estrich and Sullivan contend that arguments about judicial
versus legislative control of abortion choice miss the point. 1
33
The important distinction, they argue, is between private and
public control. 3 1 Certain decisions, they explain, are commit-
ted to the private sphere. The Framers never intended to com-
mit all moral disagreements to the political arena--quite the
contrary:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw cer-
tain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other funda-
mental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections.
This invocation of a foundation of "fundamental rights" that
transcends politics is predictable and appropriate. It also high-
lights a problem. No single fundamental right is secure unless
we respect the ideal of fundamental rights generally. In the
context of a broader critique, Justice Scalia illustrates the
dramatic tension between this ideal and the common law mod-
el of constitutional construction that Estrich has endorsed
136
and that is vitally important in sustaining the abortion right.
... [This all] took nine or ten days, and once the soldiers had
concluded that the villagers were no longer armed they dropped
their pretense of friendliness.
Alec Wilkinson, A Changed Vision of God, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 24,
1994, at 54-55 (emphasis added).
132 See SIMKIN ET AL., supra note 130, passim; see also Johnson, su-
pra note 45, at nn.37-52.
133 See Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 131.
134 See id.
... See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
638 (1943).
136 See Susan Estrich, Deserving of the Most Serious Scrutiny, HARV.
L. BULL., Oct. 1991, at 24 (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C.
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991)).
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[T]he record of history refutes the proposition that the evolv-
ing Constitution will invariably enlarge individual rights.
The most obvious refutation is the modern Court's limitation
of the constitutional protections afforded to property .... So
also, we value the right to bear arms less than did the
Founders (who thought the right of self-defense to be abso-
lutely fundamental), and there will be few tears shed if and
when the Second Amendment is held to guarantee nothing
more than the state National Guard. But this just shows that
the Founders were right when they feared that some (in their
view misguided) future generation might wish to abandon
liberties that they considered essential, and so sought to
protect those liberties in a Bill of Rights. We may like the
abridgment of property rights and like the elimination of the
right to bear arms; but let us not pretend that these are not
reductions of rights.
Perhaps the most glaring defect of Living
Constitutionalism ... is that there is no agreement, and no
chance of agreement, upon what is to be the guiding principle
of the evolution .... What is it that the judge must consult to
determine when, and in what direction, evolution has oc-
curred? Is it the will of the majority, discerned from newspa-
pers, radio talk shows, public opinion polls, and chats at the
country club? Is it the philosophy of Hume, or of John Rawls,
or of John Stuart Mill, or of Aristotle? As soon as the discus-
sion goes beyond whether the Constitution is static, the evo-
lutionists divide into as many camps as there are individual
views of the good, the true and the beautiful.'37
While Scalia's own approach to constitutional interpretation is
subject to criticisms of inconsistency,'3 8 his critique usefully
highlights the difficulty of Estrich's reliance on the theme of
fundamental rights that transcend politics.
Estrich faces serious questions about her commitment to the
137 Antonin Scalia, Vigilante Justices: The Dying Constitution, NAT'L
REV., Feb. 10, 1997, at 32-33. Justice Scalia does not suggest that the
expansion of individual rights is inevitably a good thing. His point is
that many who tout rights expansion as a primary virtue of the "living
constitution" are wrong. See id. at 33-35.
l' See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of
the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782,
808 (1995).
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ideal of fundamental rights when the question moves beyond
abortion to the costly and controversial right to bear arms.
Where the topic is abortion, she contends that the constitution-
al design places it, and other "fundamental rights," above the
fray of politics and commands judges to protect them. Here,
Estrich is sufficiently committed to the broad ideal of funda-
mental rights that she is able to discern an abortion right that
is unenumerated. Yet, when the focus shifts to the right to
keep and bear arms, which Scalia contends suffers from the
very threats that the fundamental rights ideal is meant to
resist, Estrich's aggressive commitment to the ideal of funda-
mental rights withers.
Estrich has entered the gun-rights debate through an open
letter published in several national political magazines and the
American Lawyer. She and twenty-six other law professors
offer a view of the Second Amendment that would eliminate it
as a barrier to laws prohibiting private access to firearms for
individual self-defense.139 "We want Americans to know: that
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled over fifty years ago that the only
purpose of the Second Amendment's 'right to keep and bear
arms' is to assure the effectiveness of state militias."140 The
open letter fails to indicate that this is only one perspective on
a deeply disputed question and fails to mention that the schol-
arly treatments of the Supreme Court's decisions, and of the
Second Amendment generally, overwhelmingly contradict the
states-rights view.1
Estrich's approach is a fair illustration of the standard posi-
tion. At a base political level, this is unremarkable.4 2 At the
139 See Albert W. Alschular, Does the 2nd Amendment Mean We Must
Tolerate This?, AM. LAW., June 1994, at 96.
140 Id.
141 See infra Appendix 1 (listing the scholarship on both sides of the
Second Amendment question in the last fifteen years). The signers of the
open letter are not on the list. Their contention that the Court has
interpreted the Second Amendment to merely protect "state militias" is
not accurate. The Miller decision to which they refer recognizes the
militia to be the entire body of people. Justice Thomas's recent concur-
rence in Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2385-86 (1997) (Thom-
as, J., concurring), explains that the Supreme Court has never decisively
ruled on the scope of the Second Amendment. See id. at 2385 n.1 (Thom-
as, J., concurring).
142 Notably, Estrich has argued against expanding the right of self-de-
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level of legal theory it is fair only if one grants that our com-
mitment to individual rights should vary substantially from
one right to the next. For Estrich this cannot be the case. She
and Sullivan recognize that the idea of fundamental rights is
itself a principle that must be protected. "[W]e don't leave
freedom of speech or religion or association to the political pro-
cess, even on good days when the polls suggest they might
stand a chance, at least in some states. The very essence of a
fundamental right is that it 'depend[s] on the outcome of no
elections.'"143 Commitment to this ideal compels one to re-
spect all fair claims of fundamental rights. If we treat funda-
mental rights as a buffet, savoring particular morsels, while
rejecting others, the ideal of fundamental rights is damaged
and all rights are at risk." As it stands, Estrich tugs hard
on both abortion and gun rights, but in opposite directions.145
fense in battered women's cases. See Susan Estrich, Defending Women,
88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1432-33 (1990) (reviewing CYNTHIA GILLESPIE,
JusTrFiABLE HOMICmE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSES AND THE LAW
(1989)).
143 Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 151 (quoting West Virginia
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
14 See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second
Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 485 (1995). The fact that a right is
relatively costly does not justify giving it a narrow, rather than broad
construction.
If one does accept the plausibility of any of the arguments on
behalf of a strong reading of the Second Amendment, but, nev-
ertheless, rejects them in the name of social prudence and the
present-day consequences produced by a finicky adherence to
earlier understandings, why do we not apply such
consequentialist criteria to each and every part of the Bill of
Rights? As Ronald Dworkin has argued, what it means to take
rights seriously is that one will honor them even when there is
significant social cost in doing so. If protecting freedom of speech,
the rights of criminal defendants, or any other part of the Bill of
Rights were always ... costless to the society as a whole, it
would truly be impossible to understand why they would be as
controversial as they are ...... "Cost-benefit" analysis, rightly or
wrongly, has come to be viewed as a "conservative" weapon to
attack liberal rights. Yet one finds that the tables are strikingly
turned when the Second Amendment comes into play.
Levinson, supra note 128, at 657-58.
45 This is particularly ironic since one of the best sources we have
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At least superficially, Estrich's support of the common law
model of constitutional interpretation promises to explain her
rendition of the standard position. In a review of Professor
Tribe's book advocating a common law model of constitutional
interpretation, Estrich contends that this approach is attrac-
tive in part because it renders the right results.146 On this
view, one might say we have properly outgrown the right to
bear arms, and grown into the right to abortion.
This suggests that the living constitution is flexible enough
to consume rights as well as create them-precisely Justice
Scalia's lament.'47 The problem for Estrich is that there is no
reason to believe that the abortion right-or any other for that
matter-is immune from being consumed by some new and
different view of the good-precisely Alan Dershowitz's warn-
ing."' Indeed, the abortion right seems more deeply at risk,
since it is both unenumerated, and by traditional mores, more
suspect than armed self-defense. 4 s
Estrich and Sullivan contend that restrictive abortion laws
violate the Equal Protection Clause, because "every restrictive
abortion law, by definition, contains an unwritten clause ex-
empting all men from its strictures."5 ° Noting that every re-
strictive abortion law has been passed by a legislature in
which men were the majority, Estrich and Sullivan raise a
theme that is also important in the gun-rights debate.
As Justice Jackson wrote, legislators threaten liberty when
they pass laws that exempt themselves or people like them:
"The Framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not
forget today, that there is no more effective practical guar-
anty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to
require that the principles of law which officials would im-
pose upon a minority must be imposed generally." The Su-
preme Court has long interpreted the equal protection clause
for discerning the modern Court's view of the Second Amendment is a
cluster of rare Supreme Court dicta concentrated in cases discussing
family and reproductive rights. See infra Part II.E.
146 See Estrich, supra note 136, at 24.
147 See Scalia, supra note 137, at 33.
141 See Gifford, supra note 12, at 789.
149 See infra Part III.
150 Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 151.
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to require even-handedness in legislation, lest the powerful
few too casually trade away for others key liberties that they
are careful to reserve for themselves.'5
Many commentators have argued that proposals for Ameri-
can gun control or prohibition raise similar concerns,
threatening to create a privileged caste of individuals who
enjoy enhanced, armed security that is denied to the general
population.1 52 Under the view that only government should
have guns, entry into this caste would depend upon one's sta-
tus as an agent of government or an individual with sufficient
political influence to extract special concessions." Don Kates
emphasizes the problems with such a structure.15
Even under New York City's extremely stringent administra-
tion, some citizens are able to obtain permits not only to own
but even to carry handguns for protection. Several years ago
the local affiliate of the National Rifle Association ob-
tained ... a list of those holding such "carry permits." Ac-
cording to official policy, a "carry permit" should have been
granted only upon the applicant's showing a "unique need"
for self-defense. Yet the list was predominantly made up of
individuals noted less for the perilousness of their life styles,
than for wealth, social prominence, and political influence.
Highly, and ironically, visible on the list were a number of
well-known "gun control" advocates.' 55
151 Id. at 152 (emphasis added) (quoting Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
152 See Johnson, supra note 45, at 43-44; Nicholas J. Johnson, Shots
Across No Man's Land: A Response to Handgun Control, Inc.'s Richard
Ahborn, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441, 446 (1995); James B. Jacobs, Excep-
tions to a General Prohibition on Handgun Possession: Do They Swallow
Up the Rule?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 5, 32-34.
153 There is evidence that this is the way concealed carry permits are
controlled in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Leonard Levitt, Smoking Gun
In Pistol Dept./Top Cop Suspended, Staff Transferred, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Jan. 23, 1997, at A4; Leonard Levitt, Pistol-Packing Partners Probed,
N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 27, 1997, at A23.
" See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Banning in Light of the Prohibi-
tion Experience, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE 139, 154 (Don B. Kates, Jr.
ed. 1984).
155 The list of New York City licensees referred to was from the
1970s. Among those listed as having concealed carry licenses were such
opponents of gun ownership as Nelson Rockefeller, former New York Con-
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The true significance of such revelations is their adverse
effect on voluntary compliance with [gun laws] ....
... When people whose lives are spent in mansions, high
security buildings, and chauffeured limousines are accorded
gun permits which ordinary citizens condemned to live and/or
work in high crime areas are denied, those citizens are likely
to assume that government places a higher value on the lives
of the wealthy or influential than on theirs. Needless to say,
ordinary citizens are unlikely either to concur in that valua-
tion or to feel many qualms about violating a law which they
deem expressive of it.
56
Estrich and Sullivan argue that the danger of subjecting the
abortion choice to the political process is heightened by the
peculiar character of the debate historically. 157 Restrictive
abortion legislation is rooted in now discredited, sexist ratio-
nales developed in the second half of the nineteenth centu-
ry. 
158
Robert Cottrol and Raymond Diamond chronicle in great
detail the racist roots of gun-control legislation that emerged
during the same period. 159 The first proposal for a federal
gressman and Mayor John Lindsey, the publisher of the New York Times
and the psychiatrist husband of Dr. Joyce Brothers (a psychologist whose
often-repeated public claim is that gun ownership is evidence of male
sexual dysfunction). He and Nelson Rockefeller are deceased as are a
number of other nationally known concealed carry licensees, e.g. Eleanor
Roosevelt, Lyman Bloomingdale, Henry Cabot Lodge, Arthur Godfrey,
Sammy Davis, Jr., Robert Goulet, Sid Caesar, and a plethora of
Rockefellers. The current New York City concealed carry license list con-
tinues to include the New York Times's Arthur Ochs Sulzberger as well
as (referring only to those nationally known): Donald Trump, Lawrence
Rockefeller, Leland du Pont, Joan Rivers, Howard Stem, Michael Korda,
William F. Buckley, and Bill Cosby. See Kates, supra note 154, at 154
n.44. See also Elite in NYC Are Packing Heat, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 8,
1993, at 3; Don B. Kates, Jr., The Battle Over Gun Control, 84 PUB.
INTEREST L. REV. 42, 45 (1986).
156 Kates, supra note 154, at 154-55 (emphasis added) (citation in
original, modified).
157 See Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 152-53.
158 See id. ("[Mlodern studies have found that support for laws ban-
ning abortion continues to be an outgrowth of the same stereotypical
notions that a women's only appropriate roles are those of mother and
housewife.")
59 See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, 'Never Intended to
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ban on "Saturday Night Specials" was sponsored by a senator
from Tennessee who was very candid about the bill's racists
impulses.6 ° Before it became socially unacceptable, judges
acknowledged that particular gun restrictions were "never in-
tended to be applied to the white population and in practice
[the restriction in question] has never been so applied." 161
The view even found its way into academic journals. In 1909,
the law review of the University of Virginia (the predecessor
publication of the current University of Virginia Law Review)
editorialized in favor of disarming "the son of Ham" through
restrictions on handguns 6 2
There is evidence that modern gun control grows from the
Be Applied to the White Population". Firearms Regulation and Racial
Disparity-The Redeemed South's Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1307, 1324-33 (1995) (reviewing the racist motivations
for nineteenth century gun restrictions in the South); Robert J. Cottrol &
Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Ameri-
canist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 342-49 (1991). See also DAVID
KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA
ADOPT THE GN CONTROL OF OTHER DEMOcRAcIEs? 322-40 (1993) (exam-
ining the effects of gun rights and restrictions on the safety of African-
Americans throughout history); Raymond Kessler, Gun Control and Politi-
cal Power, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 381, 391-94 (1983).
160 See 65 CONG. REC. 3946 (1924).
Here we have laid bare the principal cause for the high
murder rate in Memphis-the carrying by colored people of a
concealed deadly weapon, most often a pistol....
' * * It is unspeakable that there is public sentiment among
the whites that negroes should not be disturbed in their carrying
of concealed weapons.
Id.
161 See, e.g., Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941) (Buford,
J., concurring); State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 669 (Ohio 1920) (Wana-
malger, J., dissenting).
162 See Comment, Carrying Concealed Weapons, 15 VA. L. REG. 391,
391-92 (1909).
It is a matter of common knowledge that in this state and in
several others, the more especially in the Southern states where
the negro population is so large, that this cowardly practice of
'toting' guns has always been one of the most fruitful sources of
crime. . . . Let a negro board a railroad train with a quart of
mean whiskey and a pistol in his grip and the chances are that
there will be a murder, or at least a row, before he alights.
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same sinister root. 6 3 Gun control advocate Robert Sherrill
admits that "[tihe gun control act of 1968 was passed not to
control guns, but to control blacks .... The fear of 'armed
niggers' ran deep; the flood tide rose steadily up Capitol
Hill . . . ."' Early last year, one of America's leading aca-
demic gun control advocates, Professor Franklin Zimring ac-
knowledged:
I have been studying "Saturday Night Specials" for twenty-
five years and have yet to find one. There is no content to the
term other than a gun that poor people with dark skins can
use to shoot each other .... There is no principled way to
define or ban "Saturday Night Specials."16
Elaborating on the privacy foundation of the abortion right,
Estrich and Sullivan argue that "[b]y compelling pregnancy to
term and delivery even where they are unwanted, abortion
restrictions ... exert far more profound intrusions into bodily
integrity than the stomach-pumping the Court [has] invalidat-
ed ... 16 Building the point that "[tihe integrity of an
individual's person is a cherished value of our society," 167
Estrich and Sullivan demonstrate the contexts in which that
point is uncontroversial: "[tihese points would be too obvious to
require restatement if the state attempted to compel abortions
rather than to restrict them."'68 Dismissing the distinction
that restrictive abortion laws do not involve physical contact,
Estrich and Sullivan argue that the state would infringe its
citizens' bodily integrity "whether its agents inflicted knife
163 David Kopel contends that the term "Saturday Night Special" may
be traced to a combination of "suicide special" and "niggertown Saturday
Night." See KOPEL, supra note 159, at 336, 367 n.220.
164 ROBERT SHERRILL, THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL AND OTHER
GUNS WITH WHICH AMERICANS WON THE WEST, PROTECTED BOOTLEG
FRANCHISES, SLEW WILDLIFE, ROBBED COUNTLESS BANKS, SHOT Hus-
BANDS PURPOSELY AND BY MISTAKE AND KILLED PRESIDENTS-TOGETHER
WITH THE DEBATE OVER CONTINUING SAME 280-97 (1975).
165 See Letter from Don B. Kates to Nicholas Johnson (Mar. 27, 1997)
(copied verbatim during Zimring's presentation at the Feb. 1996 Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology symposium at which Kates was a dis-
cussant on the panel with Zimring) (on file with author).
166 Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 116, at 126.
167 Id. at 126 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).
168 Id. at 127.
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wounds or its laws forbade surgery or restricted blood transfu-
sions in cases of private knifings."6 9
There is a parallel argument for armed self-defense. By
preventing victims from effectively resisting deadly attacks,
prohibitions on individual firearms would more deeply intrude
upon bodily integrity. In that case, the state intrusion is worse
than prohibiting a citizen from seeking treatment (surgery or
transfusion in the Estrich example). Now, the state is banning
tools that might allow the citizen to resist the injury in the
first place.
One objection to this comparison is that abortion is more
efficient than armed self-defense. Abortion will, in virtually
every instance, end the physical intrusion on the woman. In
contrast, a victim's gun will not always end or avoid the physi-
cal intrusion by the criminal. 7 ° Indeed, the armed victim
might end up worse off because of her gun. 7'
The cases to which Estrich and Sullivan analogize eliminate
this objection (both the surgery and the transfusions present
similar inefficiencies between act and benefit). But the objec-
tion does invite a useful point of information. While the gun is
not a perfectly efficient tool, empirical work shows that the
gun is a highly effective instrument of self-defense. Gary Kleck
shows that large numbers of people successfully use guns for
self-defense.'72 Considering among other things, the avoided
costs of crime, John Lott argues that more liberal laws grant-
ing licenses to carry concealed weapons produce a considerable
net social and economic benefit.'73 While empirical claims are
often met with skepticism in this debate, gun-control advocate
Marvin Wolfgang's assessment of KIeck is telling.
I am as strong a gun-control advocate as can be found
169 Id.
170 See Kates, supra note 32, at 147-48; Kleck & Gertz, supra note
32, at 152.
171 National data indicates that victims who use guns in self-defense
are injured only half as often as those who submit, and only one third
as often as those who resist with other weapons. See Don B. Kates et
al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of Propa-
ganda?, 62 TENN. L. REV. 513, 538 (1995).
172 See KLECK, supra note 8, at 124.
173 See Lott & Mustard, supra note 32, at 59-62.
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among the criminologists in this country. If I were Mustapha
Mond of Brave New World, I would eliminate all guns from
the civilian population and maybe even from the police. I
hate guns-ugly, nasty instruments designed to kill people.
My reading of the articles in this Symposium has been en-
lightening even though I have been reading research on guns
and violence for over a quarter of a century, ever since the
Eisenhower Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence ....
... As a gun-control advocate, I am pleased to add [the
policy claims from a study of gun markets] to my advocacy.
What troubles me is the article by Gary Kleck and Marc
Gertz. The reason I am troubled is that they have provided
an almost clear-cut case of methodologically sound research
in support of something I have theoretically opposed for
years, namely, the use of a gun in defense against a criminal
perpetrator. Maybe Franklin Zimring and Philip Cook can
help me find fault with the Kleck and Gertz research, but for
now, I have to admit my admiration for the care and caution
expressed in this article and this research.
Can it be true that about two million instances occur each
year in which a gun was used as a defensive measure against
crime? It is hard to believe. Yet, it is hard to challenge the
data collected. We do not have contrary evidence. The Nation-
al Crime Victim Survey does not directly contravene this
latest survey, nor do the Mauser and Hart studies....
The Kleck and Gertz study impresses me for the caution
the authors exercise and the elaborate nuances they examine
methodologically. I do not like their conclusions that having a
gun can be useful, but I cannot fault their methodology. They
have tried earnestly to meet all objections in advance and
have done exceedingly well.174
The contention that your gun is forty times more likely to
injure a member of your household than to be used in self-
defense is a catchy political slogan, but there is good evidence
that factually it is just wrong, and at a minimum, highly de-
batable.17 5  The slogan is drawn from Doctors Arthur
174 Wolfgang, supra note 32, at 188-92.
17 Compare the statistics compiled by the National Safety Council,
showing the number of people killed in gun accidents each year in the
136 [Vol.50:97
PRINCIPLES AND PASSIONS
Kellermann and Donald Reay's New England Journal of Medi-
cine study.176 Even under the most generous view, the study
does not support the story of forty children or spouses acciden-
tally shooting one another as the cost of a single thwarted
criminal attack. Most of the household shootings in the
Kellermann study are suicides.17 7 Moreover, Kellermann does
not even consider the great majority of defensive gun uses
where no one is killed.
Kellermann and a colleague reviewed six years' worth of
gunshot deaths in Seattle. About half occurred in the home
where the weapon was kept. The researchers found that "for
every case of self-protection homicide involving a firearm
kept in the home, there were 1.3 accidental deaths, 4.6 crimi-
nal homicides and 37 suicides involving firearms'-an overall
ratio of almost 43 to 1....
Kellermann's critics argue that using death as the sole
criterion for measuring the risks of gun ownership is inappro-
priate: The huge majority of defensive firearms uses-99
percent, critics say-involve no more than wounding, missing
the target or brandishing the gun. Kellermann, they say,
passes off his work as a risk-benefit analysis even though it
measures risks alone.... In his 1986 study, Kellermann
seems to admit the problem: "Studies such as ours do not
include cases in which intruders are wounded or frightened
away by the use or display of a firearm ....
range of 1,400, see Kates et al., supra note 171, at 556-61, 567-70, tbl.2,
with Kleck's estimates of defensive gun uses. See KLECK, supra note 8,
at 104-08.
176 See Arthur L. Kellermann & Donald T. Reay, An Analysis of Fire-
arm-Related Deaths in the Home, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1560
(1996).
117 See id. at 1559 tbl.3.
178 Gordon Witkin, Should You Own A Gun, The Answer May Depend
on Which of the Two Seminal Researchers You Believe. They Have
Reached Sharply Different Conclusions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
15, 1994, at 24, 30 (emphasis added). Witkin interviews Kellermann and
Kleck and provides a very accessible summary of their research and
findings as well as their criticism of the other's work. Kellermann's objec-
tion to Kleck is that his results rest on "an ambiguous definition of self-
defense." Id. at 28. Kleck's subsequent survey, praised by Marvin
Wolfgang, see supra note 32, answers these objections through deeply de-
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The empirical debate is important to clarify because narrow
or contestable empirical claims are sometimes employed to
glibly dismiss gun-rights arguments. But there is a deeper
point. Our interpretation of fundamental rights should not rise
or fall on questions of statistical efficiency. That a right be-
comes too costly to tolerate means we should amend the Con-
stitution to eliminate it. Short of that, a commitment to the
ideal of fundamental rights demands that we defend the right,
indeed exalt it.
D. Self-Determination and Equality: Controlling One's Full
Life's Course
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has suggested that the opinion
in Roe "presented an incomplete justification" for the Court's
decision.'79 Criticism of Roe, she argues, might have been
less severe had the Court linked the abortion right more solid-
ly to principles that prohibit discrimination against wom-
en. 
180
Traditionally, Ginsburg says, the abortion analysis considers
the conflict between the mother and fetus, and state versus
private control of a woman's body.' If we incorporate equal
protection concerns, she argues, then "[a]lso in the balance is a
woman's autonomous charge of her full life's course." 82 In-
tailed questioning about each surveyed event. See Kleck & Gertz, supra
note 32.
179 Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 382.
1"0 See id. at 382. Ginsburg also argues that had the Court focused
purely on the restrictive Texas statute at issue, and not adopted the
trimester test, the legislative trend toward less restrictive abortion regu-
lations might have continued. See id.
181 See id. at 383. The equal protection argument, she notes, should
not be undermined by the difference. See id. at 382. Society, not nature,
attaches greater stigma to the mother of the unwanted child, and com-
mands women to take major responsibility for child care. See id. at 382-
83.
.2 Id. at 383. Professor Karst views a "woman's autonomous charge
of her full life's course" as "her ability to stand in relation to man, soci-
ety, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen." Id.
In a world where the burdens of unwanted children bore equally on men
and women, should the father be given broader rights to affect the abor-
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corporating this value, she contends, would make it easier to
strike the balance in favor of the woman. 8 3
The right of armed self-defense relies on a similar but more
basic theme. It emphasizes the individual's fundamental inter-
est in preserving her own existence, and avoids the numerous
complications of Ginsburg's proposition that autonomy means
the right to control the quality and direction of one's life even
to the severe detriment of innocents. Indeed, self-preservation
is a prerequisite to efforts to manage the quality and direction
of one's life.' Feminist commentator Jane Cohen emphasiz-
es that physical security is the foundation of liberty of thought,
speech and movement. 185 Ben Zipursky summarizes:
What is at stake ... is not only physical security, but, as
Jane Cohen has pointed out, liberty of thought, speech, move-
ment, and sexuality. Physical domination is an instrument
for the elimination of these forms of liberty, and for the elimi-
nation of psychological independence and well-being. And one
particularly important enhancement of the physical domina-
tion is the elimination of the dominated woman's access to
outside help.1
86
Feminist critiques of the self-defense claims of battered
women present individual self-defense as essential to a
woman's control of her full life's course. 187 Mary Ziess Stange
tion decision? Would not the choice under those circumstances affect his
control of his "full life's course?"
183 See id. at 384-85.
18 There are of course police. But their role and capabilities are
limited. They have no duty to guard individual citizens and that is not
their assignment. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989); South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 396, 402-03 (1855); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618-19 (7th
Cir. 1982). Second, the role of police is reactive, not protective. See
KLECK, supra note 8, at 121; Johnson, supra note 152, at 143-47.
185 See generally Jane Maslow Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny:
What Do They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal Law?, 57 U. PIrr.
L. REV. 757 (1996) (postulating that murders committed by women who
are the victims of repeated physical abuse may be morally justified).
186 Zipursky, supra note 90, at 591 (discussing Jane Maslow Cohen,
Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for the
Criminal Law?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 757 (1996)).
187 See, e.g., Hope Toffel, Crazy Women, Unarmed Men, and Evil Chil-
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is mystified by fellow feminists who, "in regard to gun regula-
tion, [willingly] tolerate precisely the kind of government intru-
sion into individual behavior that they abhor, on sound femi-
nist grounds, when it comes to such issues as sexual orienta-
tion or reproductive rights."8 ' These observations reflect the
basic Maslovian hierarchy of human concerns. Before one can
take "autonomous charge of one's full life course," to "self actu-
alize" in Maslow's terms, 89 one must first deal with more
fundamental concerns-centrally, physical security.' 9°
E. Liberty as Autonomy, Bodily Integrity, Choice, and Self
Determination: Coalescence in Casey
The values and ideas elevated by the projects already dis-
cussed in this section coalesce roughly in the plurality decision
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.'9' In Casey, the Court artic-
ulated, more specifically than in Roe, why reproductive choices,
including abortion, are constitutionally protected. The Court
explained that the right to abortion rests on a "rule (whether
or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integri-
ty .... 1)192 "The mother who carries a child to full term is
subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only
she must bear .... Her suffering is too intimate and personal
for the state to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the
woman's role ....
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
dren, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 337, 374 (1996) (advocating a shift from the
model of learned helplessness to survival strategies in domestic violence
cases).
188 Stange, supra note 96, at 20. Stange points out that the argument
that women should not trust themselves to use guns competently is a
throwback to sexist stereotypes. See id.
189 See Charles Handy, The New Equation, HOSP. & HEALTH NET-
WORKS, Aug. 5, 1995, at 34, 36 (elaborating on Maslow's hierarchy of
needs).
10 In an earlier article, I discussed the near universal value of self-
preservation and personal security against physical threats. See Johnson,
supra note 45, at 57 n.181.
191 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12 Id. at 857.
193 Id. at 852.
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choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State. 194
These values can be reduced further. More basic than "[de-
fining] one's own concept of existence"'9 is preserving one's
existence. It is repugnant for the state to dictate one's concept
of existence. It is more repugnant for the state to bar individu-
als from possessing arguably the most effective tools for resist-
ing wrongful threats to that existence. This is especially dis-
turbing considering the state has no obligation to protect any-
one in particular,1 9 and practically speaking, is not equipped
to provide such individual protection.19 v Moreover, it is deep-
ly offensive to offer police as an exclusive and unproblematic
security option for those who have experienced neglect, overt
hostility, and abuse from police (e.g., minorities and battered
women).'9 8 Finally, it is clear from Donald Regan's and Ju-
dith Thomson's self-defense analogies, that the physical bur-
dens of pregnancy and childbirth pale in comparison to the
"9 Id. at 851 (emphasis added). This is the foundation of the analysis
but the Court cautions:
These considerations begin our analysis of the woman's
interest in terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it, for this
reason: though the abortion decision may originate within the
zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exer-
cise. Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with conse-
quences for others: for the woman who must live with the impli-
cations of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist
in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must
confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures
some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent
human life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for the life or poten-
tial life that is aborted.
Id. at 852.
195 Id. at 851.
196 See Fletcher, supra note 75, at 585-86.
197 See KLECK, supra note 8, at 142.
198 See Johnson, supra note 45, at 21 n.61, 57 n.181.
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physical harm the victim confronts in the model case of armed
self-defense. 199
The standard position highly values choice and autonomy in
the metaphysical exercise through which one forms her unique
concept of existence, so much so that it easily tolerates the
elimination of a fetus in pursuit of these values. When the
question shifts to choices that might be vital to simply preserv-
ing one's existence, the standard position condemns and would
deny private choice in favor of a homogenized, structurally
inadequate public response provided by local governments with
varying degrees of commitment. A state-imposed "one choice
fits all" approach is deemed repugnant when the question is
the meaning of life and the accompanying right to abortion.
Yet the standard position finds "one choice fits all" perfectly
acceptable when the question is the preservation of life and
armed self-defense.
This is doubly ironic when we consider that the conceptions
of autonomy and choice that coalesce in Casey rest on a foun-
dation that, in the view of at least some Justices, explicitly
includes an individual right to keep and bear arms.
The most familiar of the substantive liberties protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment are those recognized by the Bill
of Rights. We have held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of the Bill of
Rights against the States. It is tempting, as a means of curb-
ing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty
encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed
to the individual against federal interference by the express
provisions of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution.
Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of
States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of
liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects. As the
second Justice Harlan recognized:
[Tihe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the
precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere pro-
199 See infra Part I.
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vided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of
isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the
right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreason-
able searches and seizures; and so on.2"'
David Kopel argues that it is "impossible" to read Harlan's
words as anything other than a recognition that the Second
Amendment protects the right of individual Americans to pos-
sess firearms.201 "Obviously, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a right of individuals against
governments; it does not protect government, nor is it some
200 Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-48 (emphases added) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also Scalia, supra note 137, at 33-35.
20. See David B. Kopel & Christopher C. Little, Communitarians,
Neorepublicans, and Guns: Assessing the Case for Firearms Prohibition,
56 MD. L. REV. 438, 540 (1997). Kopel and Little point out another case
in which the Court suggests that decisions relating to family autonomy
rest on a liberty foundation that explicitly includes the right to bear
arms. See id. at 541. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1976), the Court employed Harlan's dissent-including the reference to a
right to keep and bear arms-in striking down a zoning regulation that
restricted cohabitation by extended families in single family homes. See
id. at 502.
The Court also mentioned the Second Amendment in Lewis v. Unit-
ed States, 445 U.S. 55, 65-66 n.8 (1980) (finding that restrictions on gun
possession by a convicted felon were constitutional because the Second
Amendment does not protect firearms that have no reasonable relation-
ship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia), and in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 409 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (noting that
the "people," as used in the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, is a "term of art" referring to "a class of persons who are
part of a national community").
Lewis and Verdugo-Urquidez highlight the puzzle of United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). Miller focuses on the militia, but recognizes
that the militia is the entire citizenry bearing their own private arms,
arms to which (under one view) they have a pre-existing right. See 307
U.S. at 179; see also L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words and Constitutional
Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311, 1329 (1997) (suggesting
that the remand in Miller for further evidentiary proceedings might
contemplate either evidence on the status of the sawed-off shotgun as a
militia weapon or disposition of the reinstated indictment, leaving the
case hopelessly ambiguous).
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kind of collective right."20 2 The most recent book-length histo-
ry of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches the same conclusion:
"[almong the rights that Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Con-
gress relied on as absolute rights of the citizens of the United
States were the right[s] to freedom of speech ... due pro-
cess... and the right to bear arms."2°3
III. TEXTUAL SUPPORT FOR ABORTION RIGHTS CRAFTED FROM
THE PLANKS OF SELF-DEFENSE
The constitutional foundation of the abortion right has been
criticized by jurists and constitutional theorists.2"' Proceed-
ing generally from an originalist or textualist position, critics
have characterized the abortion right as a product merely of
Justices' political preferences.2 5
Sheldon Gelman answers these criticisms with an argument
that develops a textual foothold for the right to procreative
autonomy.20 6 Gelman argues that the abortion right is better
supported on a more traditional view of the Fourteenth Amen-
202 Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 540.
203 MICHAEL KENT CuRTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 104 (1986).
Curtis chronicles debates extolling the right to arms and equating it to
the rights of free expression, religious liberty, due process, jury trials and
the right against unreasonable searches. See id. passim.
204 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 112 (1990)
(declaring that "the right to abort, whatever one thinks of it, is not to be
found in the constitution"); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 943 (1973) (contending that
Roe "lacks even colorable support in the constitutional text, history or
any other appropriate source of constitutional doctrine"). Justice Scalia
would deny the abortion right on the ground that "the Constitution says
absolutely nothing about [abortion)." Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205 See generally BORK, supra note 204, at 113-26 (contending that
Roe v. Wade was the product of judicial preference as the right to abor-
tion cannot be found anywhere in the Constitution); Ely, supra note 204,
at 943-49 (comparing Lochner with Roe to reach the conclusion that both
were the product of judicial policy-making rather than sound constitution-
al interpretation).
26. See Sheldon Gelman, "Life" and Liberty: Their Original Meaning,
Historical Antecedents and Current Significance in the Debate Over Abor-
tion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1994).
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dment's "life, liberty and property."20 7 He argues that a fuller
conception of "life" can transform interests that qualify only
marginally as aspects of "liberty" into "life" interests that gain
greater constitutional protection. 2" Gelman concedes that
liberty, traditionally understood, is ill-suited to do the work
that Roe and its progeny require. 29 The Court's unreflective
presentation of the abortion right as a "liberty" interest, he
says, invites the criticism that the abortion right has no solid
constitutional footing.210
Life, Gelman argues, as understood by the framers and the
legal and political philosophers who influenced them, is a
broad concept that encompasses quality of life con-
cerns-ultimately the right to a "full life."211 This right to
make decisions about the direction and quality of one's life,
Gelman argues, is a solid textual hook that deflates originalist
and textualist criticisms of the abortion right.
212
Gelman builds his point principally through a discussion of
Locke, Hobbes, Blackstone, and state constitutional tradi-
tions.213 He shows how the broad formulations of "life" appar-
ent in these sources were fully integrated into the Constitution
and other public documents, only to be supplanted by the
strawman of "liberty" at the end of the 19th century.214
Gelman's exercise is notable because he draws upon sources
(often precisely the same passages) and employs themes that
gun-rights commentators have used to support an individual
right to arms for self-defense.215
207 See id. at 591-92.
.208 See id. at 692. With 'life" as a textual foothold, abortion restric-
tions warrant strict scrutiny. See id.
209 See id. at 690.
210 See id. at 591; see generally BORK, supra note 204, at 111-16.
211 Gelman, supra note 206, at 588.
212 See id. at 588-89.
213 See id. at 612-64.
214 See id. at 664-65.
215 See generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE
ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 27-35 (1984) (Locke,
Sidney, Harrington, Burgh, Beccaria, Rousseau, Montesquieu, etc.); Don
B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection,
9 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 89-103 (1992) (Locke, Sidney, Blackstone,
Montesquieu); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty and
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Gelman begins with Locke, arguing that the "modern con-
struction of 'life, liberty and property' mirrors Locke's construc-
tion, using the same three elements to ,produce an inverted
structure."21 According to Gelman, Locke viewed "liberty" as
merely a logo, a conceptual vessel, that can hold rights derived
from other sources. 217 "Life," on the other hand, encompassed
a variety of substantive interests related to "quality of
life".
218
In language that Gelman calls "pivotal," Locke declares that
everyone is bound to "preserve himself."21 9 From this core
conception of self-preservation, Gelman advances that Locke
derived "liberty," as well as all other natural rights, from the
the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 118-19 (1987)
(Hobbes, Locke); Robert Shalope, The Ideological Origins of the Second
Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599, 601-05 (1981); Robert Shalope, The
Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125,
126-33 (1986) (the Florentine-Atlantic School through Trenchard and
Burgh).
216 Gelman, supra note 206, at 633.
217 See id. at 635 (demonstrating Locke's use of "liberty" as a summa-
ry term or logo for civil rights that are derived from other ideas, for
example "life"). Gelman observes that the Framers used "liberty" as the
same sort of summary term. See id. at 635-36. The mistake, says
Gelman, is that "300 years later, American courts began to derive natu-
ral rights from liberty, the reverse of Locke's procedure, and virtually no
one noticed the difference." Id. at 636. Without reference to phrases such
as life, limb, health, property and goods, we cannot properly fill the emp-
ty shell of liberty with rights. See id. at 636.
211 See id. at 622.
219 See id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
119-20 (Dutton 1975) (1690)). In this pivotal passage of The Second Trea-
tise, Locke wrote:
[tihe state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which
obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all
mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and in-
dependent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health,
liberty or possessions . . . . Every one . . . is bound to preserve
himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like rea-
,son, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought
he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind, and not
unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair
the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty,
health, limb or goods of another.
Id.
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concept of "life."22°
Like Hobbes, then, Locke began with an expansive concept of
"life." In the quoted passage, Locke derived all other rights-
liberty, health, limb, and gods-by exploiting ambiguities in
the words "life" and "preservation." He began, as Hobbes had,
with "life" as self preservation .... Yet, that meaning ex-
pands over the course of the paragraph into a broader right
of "life."
The duty to preserve one's own life became the duty to pre-
serve everyone's life . . . . "Preserving" life thus means "not
impair[ing]" life. Not impairing life, in turn, entails protect-
ing a person's liberty, health, limb, and goods. The duty of
refraining from suicide, with which Locke began the para-
graph, turns into everyone's entitlement to a full life, by the
end of the paragraph.2 2 '
Since Gelman's starting point is a Lockean right of self-pres-
ervation, 222 it seems much more difficult to generate a right
22 See Gelman, supra note 206, at 623.
221 Id. at 622-23 (parenthetical omitted). It is just as easy to read the
language differently, concluding that the liberty, health, and goods of
another ought to be protected because they "tend[ I to the Preservation
of the Life." Id. at 623. That reading, focusing on these items as essen-
tial to the preservation of life, contradicts Gelman's conclusion that pres-
ervation of life is a Lockean doorway to everyone's entitlement to a full
life. See id.
Gelman acknowledges this but concludes that this reading is too
strict because it "fails to explain the panoply of natural rights Locke
posited in the Second Treatise." Id.
His own reading says Gelman, does account for these rights. How-
ever, Gelman admits that his reading "fails to explain ... how those
rights follow from the duty of 'not quitting one's station,' . . . that was
Locke's starting point." Id. Gelman's answer is merely that "[elvidently,
'life' has come to mean not just existence, but a full or good or unimped-
ed 'life'." Id.
Of course Locke's life-rights might very well be a closed list that
does not admit the abortion right. More than that, Locke's admonition,
that one might only impair "life" where necessary to bring an offender to
justice, is an obstacle to Gelman's jump from the right to a full life, to
the right of parents to violently terminate a pregnancy.
2 Interestingly, Gelman takes his own narrow view of Locke's core
concept of self-preservation. Locke wrote that '[elvery one is bound to
preserve himself and not to quit his Station wilfully." JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 120 (Dutton 1975) (1690). It is reasonable to
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to terminate a pregnancy that is no threat to the life of the
mother, than to generate a right of self-defense.223 This be-
comes clearer when we consider the other obstacles Gelman
faces.
In the second part of the "pivotal"22 4 passage, Locke de-
clares that one cannot take a life unless it is to do justice to an
offender.225 A right of self-defense flows smoothly from this
language and is aided by Locke's other explicit references to
self-defense.
It cannot be supposed that [the populace] should intend, had
they a power so to do, to give any one or more an absolute
arbitrary power over their persons and estates .... [Tihis
were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state
of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right
against injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force
to maintain it .... Whereas by supposing they have given up
themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a
legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him to
make a prey of them when he pleases .... 22
Proceeding on this view, we are left merely to discuss the types
of tools one is entitled to use in meeting these potential
threats.
The abortion right faces more difficulty. Gelman must either
deny that the fetus represents any life-value at all or somehow
establish that the fetus is an "offender against whom justice is
being done." Query which burden is greater? Virtually every-
one in the debate appears to concede that denying the fetus
some level of life-value is increasingly difficult as it moves
toward viability.22 v Judith Thomson comes closest to estab-
view the first clause as an endorsement of individual self-defense, partic-
ularly, given that Locke, in the same paragraph, discusses the impair-
ment of life of another where required to "do [j]ustice to an offender." Id.
Gelman, however, ignores this possibility and consistently presents
Locke's core message as merely a duty "not to commit suicide." See
Gelman, supra note 206, at 622.
223 I have made this argument elsewhere. See Johnson, supra note 45,
at 80 n.250.
2 See Gelman, supra note 206, at 622.
225 See LOCKE, supra note 222, at 120.
226 Id. at 186-87.
227 See Partial-Birth Abortion: Joint Hearing Before the Senate JUdi-
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lishing the fetus as an offender.228 But even her claim de-
pends on the remarkable contention that the parents have no
responsibility for the child until they decide to take it
home.229
By Gelman's own formulation, self-defense is closer to the
core of Lockean "life" than is the abortion right.230 To extract
the abortion right we must extrapolate from Locke's fullest,
though less frequent and less powerful formulations of "life,"
which "treat health, limb and body23' as aspects of life."23 2
The Lockean concepts on which Gelman builds figure promi-
nently in scholarship supporting the individual rights view of
the Second Amendment.233 Arguing that self-defense is at the
core of the Second Amendment, Don Kates contends that the
Framers' view of self-protection was not only stronger, but also
more inclusive than the concept described by modern think-
ers.
234
ciary Comm. and the House Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution,
105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL 8219816 (statement of Kate
Michelman, President, National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action
League) [hereinafter Michelman].
228 See generally Thomson, supra note 14.
29 See id. at 65.
230 See Gelman, supra note 206, at 632. Compare the use of Locke in
sources cited supra note 215.
231 Gelman moves from Locke's phrase "indolency of body" to his own
shorthand "body." See Gelman, supra note 206, at 632. Arguably the
abortion right is more readily drawn from Gelman's shorthand than from
Locke's original (used only once) "indolency of body." See id.
232 See id. Gelman also acknowledges Locke's distinction between
"natural liberty" and the liberty of persons in political society, or "civil
liberty." See id. at 628. This distinction, however, does not diminish the
"natural liberty" life-rights on which Gelman focuses. "[Liaws enacted by
a duly constituted legislature do not abridge civil liberty, provided the
laws comport with natural right .... According to Locke, enacted laws
may be invalid for substantive or procedural reasons. Substantively, the
laws must comport with natural right . . . ." Id. at 628, 630.
233 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 215; Joyce Lee Malcolm, The
Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition,
10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 290-313 (1983).
23 See Kates, supra note 215, at 89-90. "Indicative of the intellectual
gulf between that era and our own is that when Montesquieu asked,
'Who does not see that self-defence is a duty superior to every precept?'
he was posing the question rhetorically rather than meaningfully." Id. at
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Radiating out directly from this core belief in self-defense
as the most self-evident of rights came the multiple chains of
reasoning by which contemporary thinkers sought to resolve
a multitude of diverse questions. For instance, seventeenth
and eighteenth century treatises on international law were
addicted to long disquisitions on individual self-protection
from which they attempted to deduce a law of nations. More
important for present purposes, John Locke adduced from the
right of individual self-protection his justification of the
right(s) of individuals to resist tyrannical officials and, if
necessary, to band together with other good citizens in over-
throwing tyranny."5
Kates contends that the Framers' belief in armed citizens
was practical as well as philosophical; that they had seemingly
boundless faith in the pragmatic impact of widespread arms
possession. According to Locke's followers Trenchard and Moy-
le, arming the people is:
the surest way to preserve [their liberties] both at home and
abroad, the People being secured thereby as well against the
Domestick Affronts of any of their own [fellow] Citizens, as
against the Foreign Invasions of ambitious and unruly
Neighbours.236
Like Gelman, Kates invokes Locke's elevation of self-preser-
vation.237 He draws from it not just support for an individual
right to firearms, but also an argument that individual self-
defense was used to sustain an array of once controversial
collective rights.23 Ironically, these collective rights are less
contested in our modern conversation than the individual right
from which they grew.239
89.
5 Id. at 90 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
236 Id. at 96 (alterations in original) (quoting JOHN TRENCHARD &
WALTER MOYLE, AN ARGUMENT SHEWING, THAT A STANDING ARMY IS
INCONSISTENT WITH A FREE GOVERNMENT, AND ABSOLUTELY DESTRUCTIVE
TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ENGLISH MONARCHY 7 (1697)).
237 See id. at 103.
238 See id. at 101-02 (arguing that the rights to resist enslavement
and to be free from searches and seizures were originally derived from
the more fundamental right to armed self-defense).
239 See id. The states' rights view at least pays lip service to the idea
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Gelman contends that Hobbes also conceived of "life" expan-
sively. At the heart of this expansive conception of life is
Hobbes's contention that natural law prevents one from doing
that which takes away the means of preserving his life.240
Gelman contends that on at least one phrasing of "life", Hobbes
moves beyond mere self-preservation to include "things . .
without which [one] cannot live . . . well."24' Gelman focuses
on Hobbes's right to resist a sovereign command denying food,
medicine or other things without which one cannot live.242
From this he derives an expansive Hobbesian view of life that
includes quality of life issues.243
Gelman is cautious about this extrapolation. He recognizes
that a right to resist sovereign commands diminishing the
quality of one's life, "would change Hobbes's theory [of the
absolute sovereign] beyond recognition." 244 His answer is that
the difference between quality of life concerns (where Hobbes
denies a right to resist) and self-preservation (where Hobbes
grants a right to resist the sovereign) has little practical signif-
icance in Leviathan, because the sovereign has no duty to re-
spect the right of disobedience and because other subjects are
of individual states maintaining independent military units. Nelson Lund
contends that, given the exclusive siting of formal military power in the
federal government, the states' rights view is structurally incoherent. See
Lund, supra note 4, at 26-29; see also Don B. Kates & Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, The Second Amendment and States' Rights: A Thought Experi-
ment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737, 1765 (1995).
240 See Gelman, supra note 206, at 618-21. Hobbes wrote that a sub-
ject enjoys a liberty to disobey sovereign commands "to kill, wound, or
mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain
from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which
he cannot live ... " THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 184 (E.P. Dutton
1950) (1651).
241 Gelman, supra note 206, at 618. In this second account Hobbes'
argued for the citizen's right to disobey sovereign commands that barred
resistance against physical assaults. See id. at 618-19; HOBBES, supra
note 240, at 164. Compare Hobbes's argument to the theme that under-
pins the regulatory agenda of anti-gun groups: "[T]he best defense
against injury is to put up no defense-give them what they want, or
run." SHIELDS, supra note 36, at 125.
242 See Gelman, supra note 206, at 618.
243 See id. at 620; HOBBES, supra note 240, at 164.
244 Gelman, supra note 206, at 618-19.
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bound to support the sovereign against the rebelling sub-
ject.24 5 All that is really important, Gelman argues, is that
Hobbes in fact used life expansively to embrace quality of life
issues.2 "
Accepting Gelman's reconciliation, we have a basis for order-
ing the abortion and gun rights.247 Hobbes's right to disobey
commands that would deprive one of life, positions self-defense
above quality of life concerns that include the abortion
right.248 While the right to disobey commands prohibiting
self-defense might be futile within Hobbes's social contract,249
it is Hobbes's very recognition of the right that indicates the
higher status of self-defense.
Focusing on the same language that Gelman says is critical,
gun-rights commentators have made a similar argument,25 °
stressing Hobbes's position that:
The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, By
all means we can, to defend our selves.
245 See id. at 619-20.
246 See id. at 618.
247 Gelman notes that this "quality of life dilemma-that Hobbes's
social contract does not authorize disobedience on quality of life ques-
tions-assumes considerable importance in modem constitutional theory.
See id. at 620-21.
2 Hobbes's formulation presents the right to resist lethal threats as
an irreducible interest: if the lethal threat succeeds, all other interests,
including concerns about quality of life, vanish.
249 This is because the sovereign has no duty to respect the right and
other subjects are bound to assist the sovereign in policing. See Gelman,
supra note 206, at 619-20.
250 See, e.g., Lund, supra note 215, at 118-19 (finding a theoretical
basis for a fundamental right to self-defense in the writings of Hobbes).
The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus
Naturale, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as
he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is
to say, of his own life ....
A Law of Nature, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall
Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do,
that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of
preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it
may be best preserved.
HOBBES, supra note 240, at 106-07 (final emphasis added).
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A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is
always voyd. For (as I have shewed before) no man can
transferre, or lay down his Right to save himselfe from
Death ....251
Hobbes's suggestion that one has the right to use any tool to
save himself from death is a natural rejoinder to the conten-
tion that a commitment to self-defense does not mean self-
defense with guns.
Hobbes's declaration, with minimal extrapolation, tells a
woman fearing attack from a stalker to ignore a governmental
bar on armed self-defense. A rural black in church-burning
country, an urban Jew in the midst of a pogrom, or a Korean
merchant targeted by riot rage, might all take similar instruc-
tions from Hobbes. As Gelman shows, it takes. more effort and
several more analytical steps to move from Hobbes to the abor-
tion right.
Gelman also draws support for the abortion right from
Blackstone.252 His section on Blackstone describes the jurist's
Commentaries on the Laws of England as the most influential
and widely-read law book in America during the late eigh-
teenth century.253 He argues that anyone familiar with
Blackstone would use "life" to delineate widely accepted no-
tions of natural right.2" Building from Blackstone's concep-
tion of "personal security," Gelman derives an interpretation of
life that encompasses "health," "limb," and "body."255 On this
broad view of life, he argues, we can rest the right to abor-
tion.25 6
251 HOBBES, supra note 240, at 107, 116.
252 See Gelman, supra note 206, at 648-51.
" See id. at 648 n.343. Gelman explains that while certain Ameri-
cans, notably Thomas Jefferson, criticized the conservative royalist, "the
disagreement never touched the enumeration of absolute rights in the
Commentaries." Id.
254 See id. at 651.
255 See id. at 650 (noting that "the 'principle aim of society,' according
to Blackstone, is 'to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those abso-
lute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature.'
These rights Blackstone called 'personal security,' 'personal liberty' and
'property.'" (citations omitted)).
256 See id. at 695. Examining the implications of broad "life-rights" on
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Along this path, the right to arms for self-defense comes
much sooner. Among Blackstone's auxiliary rights, those essen-
tial to preserving primary rights (including personal security),
is the right to individual arms.
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject ... is that of
having arms for their defense, suitable to their condition and
degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also de-
clared by the same statute, and it is indeed a public allow-
ance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance
and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws
are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppres-
sion.257
Blackstone's explicit endorsement of an individual right to
arms and his influence on the thinking of the Framers is a
significant theme in scholarship urging an individual rights
view of the Second Amendment.258 Nelson Lund argues that
the Framers:
may well have been misinformed about many aspects of Eng-
lish life and history that might have a bearing on one or
another provision of the American Constitution. If anything
about English history matters in interpreting the Second
Amendment, it is the fact-a fact made virtually indubitable
by all that was said about it by those who were responsible
for its adoption-that Americans accepted the basic theory
set out by Blackstone: that a free citizen's right to arms is
founded in the natural right of self-preservation and that an
armed populace is an extremely important safeguard against
tyranny. If one knew only two things-what Blackstone said
and that Blackstone was considered the authoritative exposi-
other constitutional questions, Gelman suggests that "life" encompasses
reputation, contrary to the Court's decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693 (1976) (holding that reputation alone does not implicate "liberty"
interests that would warrant due process protection). See Gelman, supra
note 206, at 695 (contending that "Blackstone counted reputation among
the things secured by the right of personal security.").
257 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 87, at *143-44 (citation omitted).
258 See, e.g., ROBERT J. COTTROL, Introduction, in GUN CONTROL AND
THE CONSTITUTION xiii (1994); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR
ARMS 142-43 (1994); HALBROOK, supra note 215, at 45, 53; Kates, supra
note 215, at 93-94; Robert T. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth
Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J. 995, 1011 (1995).
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tor of the English constitution-one would know virtually all
the English law that is helpful in interpreting the Second
Amendment.259
Some Second Amendment scholars take a page directly from
Gelman, arguing that Blackstone informs not just our under-
standing of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, but also our
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 ° Robert
Cottrol argues that Blackstone's confirmation of an individual
right to arms influenced the Framers' view that, among other
things, the Fourteenth Amendment was guaranteeing to freed-
men the same right to firearms for self-defense that already
was enjoyed by white citizens.26' Compared to the explicit
support for an individual right to arms that Cottrol, Raymond
Diamond, Akhil Amar, Steven Halbrook, and others have
drawn from the debates surrounding the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Gelman's extrapolation pales.262
Consider Blackstone's explicit criticism of abortion. Toward
the end of his presentation, Gelman acknowledges Blackstone's
precise views. "Blackstone considered abortions after 'quicken-
ing' to be illegal, arguing that legally protected life begins at
the point of quickening, when a fetus 'is able to stir in the
259 Lund, supra note 4, at 14.
260 See, e.g., COTTROL, supra note 258, at xiv.
261 See id.
262 See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note
159, at 346 (explaining that attempts to disarm freedmen played an im-
portant role in convincing the 39th Congress that traditional conceptions
of federalism and individual rights needed to change, leading to the in-
corporation controversy); Stephen Halbrook, Personal Security, Personal
Liberty, and "The Constitutional Right to Bear Arms:" Visions of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 341,
431-34 (1995) (providing a detailed account of debates confirming congres-
sional intent to incorporate the individual rights view of the Second
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1237 (1992)
(documenting through floor speeches that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to protect generally the freedoms in the Bill of
Rights, including the right to keep and bear arms); Sayko Blodgett-Ford,
Note, Do Battered Women Have a Right to Bear Arms, 11 YALE L. &
POL'y REV. 509, 516 (1993) (arguing that the stated intention of many of
those ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment was to extend a right to keep
and bear arms, even if the Second Amendment does not).
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mother's womb,' and noting that abortion after quickening,
though illegal, constitutes an offense less serious than murder
or manslaughter."263
Gelman contends that the restrictive position recounted by
Blackstone does not significantly injure his argument.2" The
important thing, says Gelman, is that generally Blackstone
took a broad view of "life."26 5 Indeed, the knowledge that
Blackstone's explicit position on abortion stems from a con-
stricted and invidious view of women in society tempts us to
dismiss the position. However, Blackstone's explicit statements
on abortion and arms for self-defense do present an illuminat-
ing comparison. It is difficult to advance the abortion right on
this foundation and yet reject an individual right to arms.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Gelman claims, a new
truncated concept, "liberty," supplanted the traditional, expan-
sive idea of "life."266 Approaching this transition, one of the
263 See Gelman, supra note 206, at 691 n.578 (citation omitted).
26 See id. at 691. Gelman's use of Francis Hutchinson presents a
similar problem. Gelman contends that Hutchinson "exercised an influ-
ence on revolutionary American that rivaled Locke's." Gelman, supra note
206, at 643. Hutchinson's position on "life" closely resembles Locke's.
Both ranked "life" first among rights, implicitly or explicitly; both rejected
the idea of "life" as mere biological existence; and both protected bodily
integrity as an aspect of "life." See id. at 645.
Hutchinson's condemnation of abortion was explicit. Gelman ac-
knowledges in a footnote that Hutchinson "thought abortions immoral."
See id. at 691 n.578. "Mankind ... ha[s] ... a right to prevent any
perversions of the natural instinct [of human reproduction] from its wise
purposes, or any defeating of its end. Such are all monstrous lusts, and
arts of abortion." Id. (quoting 2 FRANCES HUTCHINSON, A SYSTEM OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 107 (Augustus M. Kelley 1968) (1755)).
265 See id. at 661.
266 See id. at 665. Second Amendment scholars contend that within
this same time period the anti-individual rights conception of the Second
Amendment first appeared. See, e.g., COTTROL, supra note 258, at xxv
(arguing that "[uit would take the social changes brought about by urban-
ization in twentieth-century America to bring about increased regulation
and new attitudes concerning arms and the Second Amendment").
Highlighting the Supreme Court's missteps, Gelman comments that
"[t]oday, the right of 'life' approaches meaninglessness." Gelman, supra
note 206, at 664. His comment tells more than he intends. Gelman criti-
cizes the Court for failing to appreciate the Constitution's broad protec-
tion of health, limb and body from which he would draw quality of life
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last markers of the expansive conception of "life" is Joseph
Story. Gelman argues that Story's Commentaries reflected the
sentiment of the times that "[t]he limbs are equally protected
with the life."
267
Unlike Blackstone, Story did not criticize abortion. This
makes Story a less complicated source for Gelman. However
Story's silence on abortion, in contrast to his explicit state-
ments supporting an individual right to keep and bear arms,
aids our comparison. Story's explanation of the Second
Amendment is a staple of the individual rights view, and is
often joined with the views of another late nineteenth century
commentator, Thomas Cooley.26" Together, they put the indi-
vidual rights view in the strongest terms. In a passage cited
approvingly by the Supreme Court in United States v. Miller,
Cooley wrote "[t]he alternative to a standing army is 'a well-
regulated militia;' but this cannot exist unless the people are
rights that would support procreative choice. See id. at 588, 691. Similar-
ly, commitment to a basic right to self-protection also has suffered. The
majority of lower federal court cases on the right to arms for individual
self-defense hold that no such right exists. See Andrew D. Herz, Gun
Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic
Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 58, 76 (1995). William Van Alstyne
comments on the virtual absence of thoughtful or useful jurisprudence on
the Second Amendment. See Van Alstyne, supra note 33, at 1239.
Practically speaking, these lower federal court cases are problematic.
Respect for federalism and the absence of federal police power, indicate
that the federal government would have minimal power to provide physi-
cal security for citizens who it is suggested have no individual right to
armed self-defense.
267 Gelman, supra note 206, at 665 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 2 COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES 697 (Melville
M. Bigelow ed., 1891)).
268 See David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a
Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559,
614, 615 n.272 (1986) (citing Story's statement that the right to keep and
bear arms offers a moral check against arbitrary power of rulers because
this right enables the people to resist and triumph over them and, citing
Cooley's view that the right of people to bear arms is necessary for pro-
tection of self-government against usurpation); Levinson, supra note 128,
at 649 nn.61 & 64 (same); Van'Alstyne, supra note 33, at 1247 n.40
(citing Cooley's statement that the Second Amendment means that people
shall have the right to keep and bear arms, and that they need no per-
mission to do so).
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trained to bearing arms."269 Cooley further stated:
The Right is General-It may be supposed from the phrase-
ology of this provision that the right to keep and bear arms
was only guaranteed to the militia; but this would be an
interpretation not warranted by the intent.... [Ihf the right
were limited to those enrolled, [by the government in the
militia] the purpose of this guaranty might be defeated alto-
gether by the action or neglect to act of the government it
was meant to hold in check. The meaning of the provision
undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the militia must
be taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms, and
they need no permission or regulation of law for the pur-
pose.270
If the focus is late nineteenth-century sources, the right of
armed self-defense enjoys far more explicit support than the
abortion right.
The result is the same when we evaluate Gelman's extrapo-
lation from early state constitutions. Gelman argues that early
state constitutions often included clauses modeled after the
Magna Carta, reflecting a broad conception of life-rights.271
While this appears accurate, it is also true that the prevailing
practice in those states was to restrict or prohibit abortion.272
Justice Scalia explains that the "longstanding traditions of
American society have permitted [abortion] to be legally pro-
scribed."273 Gelman contends that Scalia's critique is itself
illegitimate, since there is no textual support for using tradi-
tion as a gauge for measuring constitutional rights.27 4 While
Scalia may make too much of tradition, Gelman is too quick to
269 307 U.S. 174, 182 n.3 (1939) (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREA-
TISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 499 (Victor H. Lane ed., 7th
ed., Little, Brown 1903) (1896)).
270 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW IN AMERICA 282 (Alexis C. Angell ed., 2d ed. 1891).
271 See Gelman, supra note 206, at 660. In a similar exercise, Joyce
Malcolm chronicles the explicit support for the right to bear arms in the
English political and legal history from which Gelman more generally
draws a broad view of life. See MALCOLM, supra note 258, passim.
272 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
273 Id. at 980.
274 See Gelman, supra note 206, at 602 n.97.
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dismiss it. Tradition figures prominently in renditions of Philip
Bobbitt's famous categories of relevant constitutional sources,
and is helpful in ordering the two rights.275
From the common foundation of early state constitutional
support (and integrating, rather than dismissing, connected
political history) the individual right to arms draws strong
explicit support. Steven Halbrook's study of state constitutional
support for an individual right to arms compiles hundreds of
supportive references from state constitutions and declarations
of rights and surrounding debates.27 6 Even in this century,
the individual right to arms has been explicitly reaffirmed in
the state constitutions (as recently as 1982).27
In the broader context of our political history, there are so
many statements from the Framers and their contemporaries
supporting an individual right to arms that it is impractical to
offer a complete list.278 The list of commentators who have
evaluated this body of information and concluded that the
Constitution does indeed protect an individual right to arms is
itself long enough to be unwieldy. 9
275 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3-119 (1982); PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991); see also Sympo-
sium, Philip Bobbitt's Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1703
(1994).
27 See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (1989).
277 A 1982 amendment to the New Hampshire Constitution declares,
"[aill persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of them-
selves, their families, their property and the state." Id. at 121; N.H.
CONST. pt. I, art. 2-a. This phenomenon is not restricted to rural states.
The Connecticut Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to
bear arms in defense of himself and the state." CONN. CONST. art. I, §
15. The Delaware Constitution provides that "[a] person has the right to
keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and State, and
for hunting and recreational use." DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20.
278 See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 215, at 7-35 (citing numerous his-
torical references to support the individual right to arms); Hardy, supra
note 266, at 561 (analyzing six periods in the development of the right to
bear arms in English and American law); THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT (David E. Young ed., 1991) (collecting documents relating to
the right to arms from the opening of the Constitutional Convention to
the ratification of the Second Amendment).
279 The list of scholarship and commentary since 1980 appears at
Appendix 1.
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Professor Powe puts this material in context.28 ° Powe dis-
mantles both Gary Wills's historical critique (Wills contends
that the Second Amendment was merely a ruse-uncovered for
the first time by him-that we can confidently ignore)2 81 and
the "single other serious historical project" arguing that the
Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual
right.282 Summarizing the historical record, Powe concludes:
Although I find myself surprised by my own words, the
historical claim for the individual rights view of the Second
Amendment seems at least as strong as the historical claim
for a strongly individualist First Amendment. Words and
guns [and French assistance] enabled a successful revolution,
and it is not surprising that the founding generation thought
highly of both .... [But] [tihere are far more references from
authoritative sources of an individual right to bear arms than
there are for a right of the press going beyond prior re-
straints.
Thus, like all other constitutional law scholars who have tak-
en the time to analyze the Second Amendment, I join with
them reluctantly singing the Monkees refrain: "I'm a believ-
er."
283
IV. THE ULTIMATE LIBERTIES AND THE HEIGHT OF
IRRESPONSIBILITY: A COMMUNITARIAN PAIRING
Gun and abortion rights are in many ways the ultimate
liberties, each entailing in its most extreme rendition the total
sacrifice of a competing life-interest. They have been targeted
210 See Powe, supra note 201. Powe is a constitutional scholar at the
University of Texas. He compares the First and Second Amendments by
using standard interpretive tools to pursue questions about constitutional
interpretation and preferences for certain rights. See id.
28' See id. at 1359-64. Powe argues, among other things, that even if
Wills were right about Madison's intentions-which Powe disputes-Wills
plainly understands that the people adopted the Second Amendment. The
understanding of the people who adopted the Amendment, and not what
Wills calls Madison's "shrewd ploy," is the controlling understanding of
the Amendment. Wills's suggestion that the understanding of the deceiver
should control is, as a general matter, deeply problematic. See id. at
1363-64.
282 See id. at 1356-59.
283 Id. at 1364-65, 1401 (citations omitted).
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as the worst examples of a political culture that exalts individ-
ual rights but ignores community and individual responsibili-
ties.
The "New Communitarians" are principal advocates of the
view that our worst social problems stem from a legal and
political structure that exalts rights, but not responsibili-
ties. 4 Communitarians have identified both the abortion
right and the gun right as emblems of a regime of rights that
fails to impose responsibilities.'
Communitarian Mary Ann Glendon invokes American abor-
tion law as an example of the extremes of "rights talk" and to
illustrate key features of the communitarian irresponsibility
critique." Glendon, an advocate of the most restrictive abor-
tion laws, condemns Roe for denying "every human being, for
the first nine months of his or her life ... the most fundamen-
tal human right of all-the right to life." 7
2 See The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsi-
bilities, in RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD 11 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995).
2" See Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DuKE L.J.
989, 1065-66 (1994).
288 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN
LAW 53 (1987). Glendon contrasts America's extreme and isolating version
of individual liberty, in which a pregnant woman has no responsibilities
to others, with western European laws striking a balance between
women's liberty and their responsibilities as members of society who are
carrying unborn life. See id. at 59.
Glendon suggests that American society and American women might
be better off with the former French law that permitted and funded a
first trimester abortion if a woman states, after a waiting period and
counseling in favor of childbirth, that she is in "distress," see id. at 15,
or the West German provisions restricting abortion to cases where preg-
nancy would pose a serious danger to a woman's physical or mental
health. See id. at 31.
In a separate project, Glendon casts the American woman under
Roe as a "lone rights-bearer," an isolated individual with the "right to be
let alone". MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 59 (1991). Alternatively,
the West German approach envisions a woman as situated within, and
partially constituted by, her relationships with others. See GLENDON,
ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra, at 37. As a result, her statutory right to
free development of her personality must be balanced against the fetus's
right to life. See id.
287 A New American Compact: Caring about Women, Caring of the
Unborn, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1992, at A23.
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Linda McClain's critique of the communitarian project, and
of Mary Ann Glendon in particular, shows that
communitarians are very willing to secure "responsibility"
through the coercive power of the state rather than the pur-
ported communitarian tools of persuasion and exhortation
through the moral voice of the community. 8
Communitarian criticisms of "irresponsible" exercises of
rights also target individual rights interpretations of the Sec-
ond Amendment.28 9 Like the communitarian approach to
abortion rights, the agenda for combating the costs that guns
impose on American society goes far beyond "education and
,,290
moral suasion. The communitarian platform summarizes
the group's stance on individual firearms this way:
There is little sense in gun registration. What we need to sig-
nificantly enhance public safety is domestic disarmament of
the kind that exists in practically all democracies. 21' The
National Rifle Association's suggestion that criminals, not
guns, kill people, ignores the fact that thousands are killed
each year, many of them children, from accidental discharge
of guns, 92 and that people-whether criminal, insane, or
temporarily carried away by impulse-kill and are much
more likely to do so when armed than when disarmed.293
28 See McClain, supra note 285, at 1051.
289 See id. at 1065.
290 See id.
291 See Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 441 & n.13 (explaining that
the communitarian platform calls for sweeping disarmament that exists
only in Japan) (citing DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND
THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER
DEMOCRACIES? 20-23 (1992)).
292 Gun accidents rarely involve pre-adolescent children. Nationwide in
1991, there were a total of 142 fatal gun accidents involving children
under age 13; approximately 60 of these involved handguns. See Gary
Kleck, Guns and Violence: An Interpretative Review of the Field, 1 SOc.
PATHOLOGY 12, 29-30 (1995).
293 As Don Kates and Gary Kleck demonstrate, the portrayal of the
ordinary citizen as a primary criminal threat is false.
The endlessly repeated argument for banning firearms is that
"[Miost murders are committed by previously law abiding citizens
where the killer and the victim are related or acquainted"; "pre-
viously law abiding citizens [are] committing impulsive gun-mur-
ders while engaged in arguments with family members or ac-
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The Second Amendment, behind which the NRA hides, is
subject to a variety of interpretations, but the Supreme Court
has repeatedly ruled, for over a hundred years, that it does
not prevent laws that bar guns. We join with those who read
the Second Amendment the way it was written, as a
communitarian clause, calling for community militias, not
individual gun slingers.9 4
The communitarian disarmament plan is a mixture of coercion
and marketing.
Perhaps the best way to proceed, if nationwide domestic
quaintances." "That gun in the closet to protect against burglars
will most likely be used to shoot a spouse in a moment of
rage .... The problem is you and me-law-abiding folks."
* * * But every local and national study of homicide shows
that murderers are far from being "ordinary citizens" or "law-
abiding folks." Rather, they are extreme aberrants, their life
histories being characterized by felony records, psychopathology,
alcohol and/or drug dependence and often irrational violence
against those around them ....
' * * The data set out in [that Chapter] show that-unlike
ordinary gun owners-roughly 90% of adult murderers have prior
adult crime records, with an average adult criminal career of six
or more years, including four major adult felony arrests.
DON B. KATES, JR., Introduction, to THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE
11 (1997).
While information is less uniformly available for juveniles, Kates
and Kleck employ data from a forthcoming Boston study to show the
same trend for juveniles murders; which are committed by a "relatively
small number of very scary kids." See David M. Kennedy et al., Youth
Violence in Boston: Gun Markets Serious Youth Offenders, and a Youth
Reduction Strategy, LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBS., Winter 1996, at
147.
294 Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 445 & n.40 (citations added)
(quoting THE COMMUNITARIAN NETWORK, THE CASE FOR DOMESTIC DISAR-
MAMENT 1 (1992)). Kopel and Little point out that the number of acci-
dental deaths from firearms is often exaggerated; in 1993 the number of
accidental deaths was 1,600. See id. The number of accidental firearm
deaths of children (ages 0-14) was 220. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL,
ACCIDENT FACTS (1994).
In his book, Etzioni puts the number of fatal gun accidents annual-
ly at 14,000. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 179 (1993).
Since 1990 the actual number has been on the order of 1400-1500 annu-
ally, a decrease since the late 1970s. See Kates et al., supra note 171, at
568-69 & tbl.2.
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disarmament cannot be achieved immediately, is to introduce
it in some major part of the country, say, the Northeast. That
will allow everyone to see the falsity of the NRA's beloved
statement that criminals kill people, not guns .... The rapid
fall in violent crime sure to follow will make [even] more
states demand that domestic disarmament be extended to
their [region].295
These suggestions have elicited a detailed response from
David Kopel and Chris Little. 29" Tracking McClain's critique
of the communitarian preference for European-style abortion
laws,297 Kopel argues that Domestic Disarmament springs
from a "European sensibility towards an armed populace."29
Kopel questions whether the Communitarians' reliance on
state coercion to achieve domestic disarmament raises more
problems for communitarians than it solves.
Echoing McClain's concerns about communitarian support
for coercion in the abortion area, Kopel presents an array of
problems with coerced disarmament. 299 He suggests that the
295 THE COMMUNITARIAN NETWORK, THE CASE FOR DoMEsTIc DIsAR-
MAMENT 8 (1992) [hereinafter DOMEsTIc DISARMAMENT] (on file with.
author).
298 See Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 445.
297 See McClain, supra note 285, at 1003, 1006.
298 See Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 451. Kopel and Little also
note that the communitarian position reflects a "low grade war" over gun
control detailed by Barry Bruce-Briggs. See id. Bruce-Briggs argued:
[Tihose who take bourgeois Europe as a model of a civilized soci-
ety: a society just, equitable, and democratic; but well ordered,
with the lines of responsibility and authority clearly drawn, and
with decisions made rationally and correctly by intelligent men
for the entire nation. To such people, hunting is atavistic, per-
sonal violence is shameful, and uncontrolled gun ownership is a
blot upon civilization.
Barry Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, PUB. INTEREST, Fall
1976, at 61.
299 Among other problems, Kopel and Little discuss the potential for
widespread non compliance with confiscation efforts by gun culture types
in law enforcement and the military, noncompliance by and
criminalization of potentially millions of America's approximately 50 mil-
lion gun owners, the danger of overwhelming the criminal justice system
with large numbers of new gun criminals,. armed resistance by gun own-
ers, and a crisis of government legitimacy that tends to follow prohibi-
tionist solutions. See Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 456-72.
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communitarian position on gun ownership reflects a superficial
and elitist treatment of an issue that communitarians have not
considered in a serious way.3 °°
The communitarian platform on abortion and gun rights
highlights a common thread. The two rights represent ex-
tremes in the balance between individual liberty and disputed
conceptions of duty. Each is a severe and often damaging exer-
cise of individual freedom. Each requires powerful justifica-
tions, if for no other reason than the costs imposed on other
very significant interests. Consequently, the two are uniquely
paired by communitarians as rights that ought to be extin-
guished through education, moral suasion and finally force.
There are many problems with the communitarian critique
of abortion and gun rights 3 11 not the least of which is that
300 Kopel and .Little argue:
Although the communitarian agenda for selective censorship,
drug testing, and the like may not comport with strict con-
struction of the Constitution, there is a recognition that freedom
of speech and privacy are tremendously important, and that First
and Fourth Amendment rights should be infringed only when
there is a compelling reason to do so. Etzioni formulates a four-
part test for when rights may be infringed: (1) clear and present
danger, (2) no alternative way to proceed, (3) "adjustments"
should be as limited as possible, and (4) infringing policies
should minimize harmful effects.
Etzioni's snide accommodation of gun collectors-by allowing
them to keep their guns if they employ his "favorite" technique
of pouring "cement in the barrel"-is likewise explainable only as
a product of condescending ignorance.
Id. at 472-73.
301 Robin West's critique is apt here. On abortion, the communitarian
proposal falls short because the community has failed to provide essential
resources that West contends are vital to women facing unplanned preg-
nancies. See West, supra note 82, at 966-67. On guns, the critique fails,
because, as Fletcher's account of self-defense shows, the community is not
competent to provide personal security for individuals. See generally
Fletcher, supra note 75, at 174-75.
Moreover, the kind of suasion and social pressure communitarians
would rely upon before using coercion, has been abused traditionally in
ways that raise fair claims, indeed demands, for the very rights that
communitarians would dismantle. Robin West, Catharine MacKinnon and
others argue that the abortion right is an essential liberty in a society
whose norms and values are corrupted by patriarchy. See MACKINNON,
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renditions of the two rights advance solid communitarian val-
ues.30 2 However, the communitarian emphasis on respongibil-
Privacy v. Equality, supra note 86, at 94-96; West, supra note 82, at 94-
96. Abuse of "community" power also is at the root of countless episodes
of racist violence that have prompted Professors Cottrol, Diamond and
others to reevaluate and endorse individual gun ownership by good peo-
ple of color. See Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note
159, at 354-55, 361.
Communitarians acknowledge these concerns glancingly. See
McClain, supra note 285, at 1035, 1036-38. The only reason the commu-
nity they imagine would not be abused in the way it has been historical-
ly-and for many of us still is-is that communitarians proclaim that it
should not be. See id. at 1029-30. This is cold comfort to those who have
been abused under earlier balances between community and individual
rights of the type communitarians pine for. See id. passim.
302 Kopel and Little point out that a communitarian stance does not
inevitably produce a prohibitionist position on firearms possession. Indeed,
it seems somewhat odd. They emphasize David Williams's contention that
a true citizen's militia (with citizens bearing their own private arms) is
the height of republican virtue. See Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at
477-87 (referencing David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the
Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551
(1991)). Kopel and Little offer communitarian principles that seem to
support a virtuous armed community and conclude
Were it not for Etzioni and the Communitarian Network's
antipathy towards firearms, Reynolds's militia proposal might be
considered mainstream communitarianism ...
... [Clonsidering how to revive the militia is the most appropri-
ate policy, both for those who consider themselves faithful adher-
ents to the Constitution and for those who genuinely embrace
communitarian values.
Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 496, 499.
Communitarian Andrew Payton Thomas embraces the armed citizen-
ry as a solid communitarian value. Arguing that the original Federal
Militia Act elevated communitarian ideals, Thomas contends
A new statutory requirement that heads of household with
noncriminal backgrounds keep a serviceable firearm in their
households and that all private firearms therefore be registered
with the government would likely provide one of the most effica-
cious means of deterring 'offenders. This law would clearly have
to be wedded to mandatory training requirements, as well as
properly strict penalties, as are now on the books in several
states, for adults who failed to store them so that they were
inaccessible to children. Also, conscientious objectors to the re-
quirement would be exempt. Aside from reinforcing the historical-
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ity does give us a framework for ordering the two rights. 30 3
An exercise of either right extinguishes some level of life-inter-
est and under some constructions fully extinguishes the most
highly protected interest in our constitutional structure. 304 It
is instructive to evaluate these respective life-interests and the
nominal duties that right-bearers owe them.
Focusing on the relative duties of the right-bearers toward
the sacrificed life-interest, the case for armed self-defense
against a criminal attacker appears stronger than the case for
terminating the innocent fetus, who we can more easily say is
owed a duty by the parents.3 °5 Granted, some have argued
the woman's sexual inequality pushes her toward the status of
an innocent who had no real ability to avoid conceiving.0 6
But even those critiques cast the woman's innocence relative to
ly vital conception of the community as ultimately responsible for
crime control, such a law could have an immediate deterrent
effect.
ANDREW PAYTON THOMAS, CRIME AND THE SACKING OF AMERICA 281-82
(1994).
Planned Parenthood and other pro-choice groups have stressed
communitarian values in their goal of making every child a wanted child.
See Candace Crandall, The Fetus Beat Us, HUM. LIFE REV., Mar. 1, 1996,
at 100.
303 See McClain, supra note 285, at 992.
'o4 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 14, at 29-30. To be sure, there are
competing conceptions of the life-interest that is impaired by the exercise
of these rights. The life-interest of the fetus during a large phase of
gestation is viewed by many to be less significant than the life-interest of
an extant adult. See Roger Wertheimer, Understanding the Abortion Ar-
gument, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 67, 80-82 (1971). Similarly, the life-interest
of a criminal aggressor or invader is generally subordinated to the inter-
est of the victim defending his own life against aggression. However, in
both debates this balancing is contested. See Thomson, supra note 14, at
45-50 (articulating the argument that human life begins at conception);
Allan R. Brockway, But the Bible Doesn't Mention Pistols!, ENGAGE/SOC.
ACTION May 1977, at 36, 40 ("Criminals are members of the larger com-
munity no less than are others. As such they are our neighbors or as
Jesus put it, our brothers . . ."). See also Kates, supra note 215, at 91-
93.
305 It is easy to construct this duty on the common-law view that we
place responsibility on the party whose action caused the problem.
308 See, e.g., MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality, supra note 86, at 95;
MACKINNON, Desire and Power, supra note 86, at 46-62; McClain, supra
note 86, at 428-29.
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the male partner, and a male-dominated society. The compari-
son is not between the mother and the fetus. °7
Compared to the innocent fetus, the criminal aggressor in
the gun-rights context is plainly more culpable. Even for some-
one like Bernhard Goetz, who apparently exceeds the bound-
aries of self-defense, it is difficult to say that his victim ap-
proaches the status of the innocent fetus.
It might be objected that this is the wrong balance to strike;
that a true measure of relative duties must consider the broad-
er societal costs of guns-e.g. suicides, accidental, negligent,
and criminal homicides. That exercise would be complicated by
work such as John Lott's and Gary Kleck's arguing that indi-
vidual firearms and armed self-defenders produce a net bene-
fit.3
0°
307 Cass Sunstein says that the samaritan/equal protection argument
allows us to avoid that balance altogether. He does one of the best jobs
of contending with the' responsibility of the parents for the plight of the
fetus. Sunstein identifies two possible challenges to his equal protection
argument. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 40. The first of these chal-
lenges is, "that pregnancy results from a voluntary activity that creates a
special duty." See id. To this challenge, he responds:
Even if this argument is accepted on .its own terms, it
would not work in cases in which pregnancy has resulted from
involuntary intercourse, such as rape and incest ...
More broadly, the fact that intercourse is voluntary hardly
means that pregnancy is. Voluntary intercourse does not mean,
as a matter of simple fact, voluntary pregnancy, any more than
the decision to walk at night in a certain neighborhood means
voluntary mugging. . . .The question is instead the (always and
inevitably normative) one of assumption of risk: whether the
decision to engage in intercourse, when voluntary, should be
taken to allow the state to impose on women a duty of bodily
cooptation in cases of pregnancy.
Id. at 40-41 (citing Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 57-59, 65 (1971)).
One might object that all this still misses the point. As between the
parents and the fetus who is closest to the traditional "responsible party"
(one in the best relative position to avoid the harm) on whom our com-
mon law often places the burden of mistakes?
308 See Kleck & Gertz, supra note 32, at 179-80; Kleck, supra note
292, at 12-47; Gary Kleck & E. Britt Paterson, The Impact of Gun Con-
trol and Gun Ownership Levels on Violence Rates, 9 J. QUANT. CRIMI-
NOLOGY 249-87 (1993); Lott & Mustard, supra note 32, at 64-65. See also
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The objection breaks down further when we consider apply-
ing it symmetrically. Would we impose a similar burden on the
mother of the unwanted fetus? Should her right be balanced
against the cumulative costs (e.g., the total number of fetuses
terminated each year, the psychological costs to those who
agonize that their society condones something they consider to
be murder,3"9 or even criminal violence by anti-abortion pro-
testers310) generated by the abortion controversy?311
In both cases the link between the individual right-bearer
and the cumulative costs generated by the right is ten-
uous.31' Moreover, actually attempting to integrate cumula-
tive costs into the duty critique shows that there is a deeper
problem with the objection.
JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER RossI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS:
A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 141-61, 238 (1986); Daniel D.
Polsby, Firearms Costs, Firearms Benefits and the Limits of Knowledge,
86 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 207 (1995).
309 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1991) (ac-
knowledging that abortion holds consequences for not only prenatal life,
but society as well, namely that society "must confront the knowledge
that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an
act of violence against innocent human life").
310 Women's .expected outrage at the suggestion that their rights
should be impaired in order to curb criminal violence of abortion protest-
ers is similar to the outrage of good citizens whose ownership of defen-
sive firearms generally is the primary thing impaired by legislative at-
tempts to curb gun violence by criminals who ignore gun and other laws.
31 This comparison highlights the fact that both abortion and defen-
sive gun use have externalities-positive and negative. Both are deeply
personal decisions, but not exclusively so. Gun control advocates highlight
an externality of gun ownership that parallels the psychological cost to
abortion opponents, who worry that their society condones what they
consider to be murder. See David Hemenway et al., Firearms and Com-
munity Feelings of Safety, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 121, 126-27
(1995) (exploring "whether increased gun ownership raises or lowers the
perceived safety of others in the community by looking at subjective be-
liefs").
312 How does the developing life-interest of the fetus compare to the
diminished life-interest of a criminal aggressor? Does the mother owe it a
lesser duty than a victim owes to the criminal attacker? How much does
the criminal aggressor's action reduce his own right to life? When is life-
interest sufficiently reduced to justify deadly force in self-defense? Our
general moral disagreements about abortion and deadly self-defense bar
agreement on these questions.
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Take the case of accidents to family members caused by
negligent storage or use of a gun in the home. Assume that the
duty of the gun-owner to the injured innocent is equal to the
mother's duty to the fetus. The comparison is confounded when
we try to incorporate cumulative costs. How does one weigh 1.5
million aborted fetuses per year313 against 1,600314 acciden-
tal gun deaths per year. Our inability to agree on the "life-
value" of the fetus confounds the comparison, incorporating
cumulative costs stalls the analysis on the life-value question
that makes these rights controversial to begin with.
V. THE POLICY DEBATE: PARALLEL THEMES AND ONE STARK
CONTRAST
The peculiar nature of abortion and gun rights produces an
array of parallel themes in tone and rhetoric surrounding the
respective policy debates. From the broad similarity between
absolutist agendas in the political arena, to the rhetorical de-
vices employed by opponents and proponents of the rights,
these congruencies trace another part of the abortion/gun-
rights intersection. At the base of these common themes is one
stark contrast between the groups that oppose the two rights.
That contrast, presented last, helps us to order the claims
against them.
A. A Conflict of Absolutes
The two rights present both a political and conceptual con-
flict of absolutes. Politically, abortion and gun rights each
confront organized, credible threats to their very existence. 15
313 See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 38 n.141 and accompanying text
(listing various sources providing pre-Roe and post-Roe abortion rates,
including illegal abortions).
314 See Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 476 n.40.
3" See, e.g., DENNIS A. HENIGAN ET AL., GUNS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION (1995).
Kopel and Little's critique of communitarian disarmament advocacy
points out numerous earlier calls for total disarmament by gun control
advocates. See Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 445-50; Jack M.
Beerman, The Supreme Court's Narrow View on Civil Rights, 1993 SuP.
CT. REV. 199, 199 ("[s]ome of the most serious threats to a woman's
ability to choose abortion have not come from government regulation, but
170 [Vol.50:97
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While there are mild comparisons in the speech area, particu-
larly with efforts to curb pornography,316 no other widely en-
joyed liberties face comparable opposition.
In the abortion debate most would acknowledge that the
deepest conflict is between those who wish to preserve abortion
as a woman's choice and those who seek to ban it (with per-
haps minor exceptions). 317 The claim that the gun-rights de-
bate presents the same clash of absolutes is often dismissed.
The disarmament goal can be inferred from the structure of
gun control laws, but that generally convinces only those who
need no convincing. 318 However, even gun control advocates
acknowledge that this fear is validated by explicit statements
from public officials and gun control advocates. 319 Randy
Barnett and Don Kates describe in detail the long list of confir-
mations from leaders of the anti-gun movement and public
officials that, for many, gun control equals disarmament suffi-
cient to prevent armed self-defense.3 0 This is almost literally
the effect of the current restrictions on gun ownership in
from private, national, organized efforts to prevent abortions").
316 These are confounded by difficulties in defining it.
3" There might be a vast middle ground of public opinion supporting
.choice with certain "reasonable limitations" but between the groups who
lead the political battles, there is no apparent room for compromise.
318 See Johnson, supra note 152, at 442-43 (The "bad gun formula,"
our dominant regulatory model, contains no discernable principle that
protects any category of firearms); see also The Second Amendment and
the Need for Congressional Protection: Testimony Before The Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary 104th Cong. (April 5, 1995),
available in, 1995 WL 151923 (testimony of Prof. Robert J. Cottrol, Prof.
Raymond T. Diamond and Assoc. Prof. Nicholas J. Johnson).
319 See Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 53 (1992). Based on the positions of the two major national gun
control groups, gun-control advocate McClurg acknowledges "the extreme
views of many gun control supporters make the slippery slope argument
understandable." Id. at 89.
320 Randy Barnett & Don B. Kates, Jr., Under Fire: The New Consen-
sus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1259 (1997)
(critiquing Andrew Herz's Gun Crazy, they conclude that "Gun Crazy's
claim that '[viirtually no one in the gun control movement calls for
confiscation,' reflects either ignorance or deceit"). See also Kates et al.,
supra note 171, at 515-17 (pointing out scores of statements and official
positions endorsing total ban on handguns and all firearms).
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Washington D.C.32' Under this legislation, lauded by gun
control groups as a model for the nation, handguns are banned
and long-guns may not be kept assembled or loaded even for
self-defense.322 The communitarian movement goes further
with an unequivocal call for the disarmament of American citi-
zens.
323
In both the gun and abortion contexts, the perceived threat
of eradication prompts similar reactions to regulatory propos-
als. Often "compromise" is perceived as right-bearers' ceding
rights incrementally in exchange for nothing more than a short
rest before the next battle. This fear of a political slippery
slope turns nearly all proposals for regulation into pitched
battles.
Two cases on point are the abortion-rights community's reac-
tion to the proposed ban on late term abortions, and the gun-
rights community's opposition to the assault weapons ban in
the 1994 Crime Bill. Those unfamiliar with these debates
might wonder why anyone would object to these limitations.
But, with every new regulation perceived, and often
claimed, 324 as a victory for the cause of eradicating the right,
the objections are easier to understand.325
321 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3204(a) (1992).
31 See id § 6-2372; see also Stephen P. Halbrook, Second Class Citi-
zenship and the Second Amendment in the District of Columbia, 5 GEO.
MASON U. CIv. RTs. L.J. 105, 105 (1995).
323 See DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 295, at 5.
324 See, e.g., Kates et al., supra note 171, at 515-19.
32 Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), discussing the passage of the
assault weapons ban that she authored, candidly admitted that the only
reason she does not seek a ban and confiscation of all guns is that it is
not yet politically feasible. "If it were up to me, I would tell Mr. and
Mrs. America to turn them in." Interview by Lesley Stahl with United
States Senator Dianne Feinstein, on 60 Minutes (CBS television broad-
cast, Feb. 24, 1995), quoted in Hand Them All In, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Oct. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4555338. David Kopel contends that
the assault weapons legislation in the 1994 Crime Bill was prompted
more by strategic and policies considerations than substantive legal
concerns. See DAviD B. KOPEL, "Assault Weapons," in GuNS: WHO
SHOULD HAVE THEM 190-92 (1995). "lJosh Sugarman authored the No-
vember 1988 strategy memo suggesting that the press and the public had
lost interest in handgun control. He counseled the anti-gun lobby to
switch to the 'assault weapon' issue, which the lobby did with spectacular
[Vol.50:97
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Both constituencies also face the strategic disadvantage of
combatting powerful, graphic images with abstractions like
"liberty" and "autonomy." One of the most powerful images in
the late term abortion debate is a pamphlet containing a chill-
ing illustration of the procedure taken from a medical journal
article. It shows a fetus being dispatched by a scalpel thrust to
the base of the, skull.326 In the gun-rights debate, the image
is not just the bloody aftermath of a shooting. The guns them-
selves (at least certain types) seem to repel some people.327
That the image of a gun and irrelevant accoutrements like
pistol grips328 have such power suggests that there is some-
thing to the observation that
the impetus to banning firearms comes less from a belief that
it will reduce crime than from a cultural and moral opposi-
tion to them. At bottom it replicates the view of many who
opposed legalization of homosexual and other practices
deemed "deviant" on moral grounds even while agreeing that
laws will not eradicate such practices. In this view prohibi-
tion is desirable even though ineffective, because it brands
the banned conduct (gun ownership, homosexual love, or
whatever) as loathsome and immoral.329
One might make the same observation about opposition to
success in 1989." KoPEL, supra note 159, at 435 n.31.
"Assault weapons" are rarely used in crime and are less lethal than
most hunting rifles. See KLECK, supra note 8, at 71; KOPEL, supra, at
179-81; Kates & Polsby, supra note 130, at 253.
326 Cf. Michelman, supra note 227 (explaining that the focus on the
abortion procedure improperly shifts one's attention from the central
issue of choice).
327 The Estrich open letter attempts to capitalize on this, by using a
photograph of an ugly gun (the Tech-9), and the caption, "Does the Sec-
ond Amendment mean we must tolerate this?" See Alschular, supra note
139. The precise objection is unclear. The Tech-9 is a 9mm, semi-auto-
matic, "pistol." It takes a detachable magazine. It is black. It is much too
large to conceal. It is not terribly accurate. It is by many accounts ugly.
The Open Letter does not explain whether the objection is to semi-auto-
matic weapons, detachable magazines, pistol grips, handguns or guns
generally. See id.
2 See Johnson, supra note 152, at 445 (describing the irrational dis-
tinctions-i.e., muzzle guards, pistol grips and bayonet lugs-between
protected and bad banned guns in the 1994 Crime Bill).
329 KATES, supra note 293, at 95.
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abortion. As discussed in Section D below, it is generally ac-
knowledged that making abortions illegal will make them more
dangerous for women and surely will stigmatize them further.
But it will not stop them.
Abortion and gun rights also present a conceptual conflict of
absolutes. Both rights elevate the life-interest of the right-
bearer to the extreme detriment of competing life-inter-
ests.33 ° The character and severity of this conflict makes the
two rights virtually unique in the panoply of constitutional
liberties and presents them as rights that invite similar treat-
ment, invoke similar principles and generate similar results in
the balance that they strike between conflicting interests.33 '
B. Opposition Folding Choice Into Utility
Conversations about gun and abortion rights contain parallel
conflicts between the value of individual choice and contentions
about the average utility of the right. In the gun debate, the
conflict grows from the assertion that the gun owner is more
330 Efforts to show that the opponents and advocates can reach a
compromise have received a decidedly mixed reaction. Reviews of Profes-
sor Tribe's ambitious attempt to map out common ground for pro-choice
and anti-abortion factions suggest that Tribe may have taken on an
impossible assignment. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Abortion, Absolutism,
and Compromise, 100 YALE L.J. 2747, 2749-50 (1991) (reviewing LAUR-
ENCE H. TRIBE, A CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990)); Michael W. McConnell,
How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1181 (1991) (same); Annette E. Clark, Abortion and the Pied Piper
of Compromise, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 274 (1993).
331 In theory, we might resist the contention that the fetus represents
a "life-interest." From the view that the fetus is not a constitutionally-
protected, extant life, one might say that it presents no protected life-
interest at all. But even the staunchest supporters of the abortion right,
while rejecting that the fetus is a person, acknowledge that it presents
some level of conflicting life-interest. See Michelman, supra note 227.
Robin West describes the dilemma that the abortion right poses for
"relational feminists." While supportive of the right, they find it highly
problematic because "the decision to terminate fetal life" is at odds with
their view of a woman's distinctive moral sensibility. See West, supra
note 82, at 962. Donald Regan frames every abortion choice as a balanc-
ing of life-interests that precisely reflect the gun-rights balance: "Unwant-
ed pregnancy is serious bodily harm justifying the use of deadly force in
self-defense." See Regan, supra note 11, at 1615.
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likely to harm herself or someone she cares about than to suc-
cessfully defend herself from a violent attack.332 This conten-
tion is refuted by empirical studies."33 In the abortion debate,
the argument is that abortion is virtually never the right
choice and that a woman ultimately will be worse off for hav-
ing chosen abortion. The argument typically focuses on the
asserted immorality of abortion and projects remorse-driven
spiritual or psychological damage.3 ' In both contexts, this
homogenization disparages personal choice and ignores the
vast variation between individual circumstances on the highly
debatable view that the choice is nearly always a bad one.335
332 See Witkin, supra note 178, at 5-7.
... See Lott & Mustard, supra note 32, at 5. John Lott's recent find-
ings contradict the contention that arming oneself is the greater danger.
See id. at 64-65. Lott criticizes a commonly cited study that argues con-
cealed weapons increase individual risks. See id. at 5 (criticizing David
McDowall et al., Easing Concealed Firearm Laws: Effects on Homicide in
Three States, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193 (1995)). Lott points out:
The paper by McDowall et al., which evaluates right-to-carry
provisions, was widely cited in the popular press. Yet, their
study suffers from many major methodological flaws: for instance,
without explanation, they pick only three cities in Florida and
one city each in Mississippi and Oregon (despite the provisions
involving statewide laws), and they use neither the same sample
period nor the same method of picking geographical areas for
each of those cities.
Id. at 5.
Lott's study evaluates all U.S. counties from 1977-1992. See id. at 9
(contending that county-wide, rather than state-wide, data increases accu-
racy); see also Kleck, supra note 8 at 269-305; supra text accompanying
notes 173-80.
" An episode of Pat Robertson's 700 Club furnishes an example. It
devoted several minutes to the story of "Michelle," whose several abor-
tions, she said, lead to spiritual decline, drug use, and years of remorse.
See The 700 Club, (CBN television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1997).
" As President, Ronald Reagan directed Surgeon General C. Everett
Koop to report on the negative psychological effects of abortion. Koop
(who was openly opposed to abortion) concluded that he could not file a
report that could withstand scientific scrutiny and that the psychological
effects resulting from abortion are minuscule from a public health per-
spective. See Medical and Psychological Impact of Abortion, Hearing Be-
fore Human Resources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 101st Cong. (1989) (including Report
and testimony of former Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop); H.R. REP.
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In practice, the decision to use a gun in self-defense or to
have an abortion may or may not turn out to be a good one.
The result is not a function of who has the most powerful or
graphic anecdotes or barrage of statistics. Rather, the result
depends on the individual circumstances of the right-bearer-
-her skill level, income, risk appetite, education, age, judge-
ment, experience, physical condition, state of mind, and geo-
graphical location. In both cases, advocates emphasize that
choice is vital.336 Both rights are core options that can dra-
matically affect the outcome of pivotal life-crises. The intensely
personal nature of the respective choices explains much of the
resistance to regulatory encroachments that would close off
options that will be important in particular cases.337
C. Regulation Reflecting State Ambivalence About the
Respective Rights
In the case of both rights, the line between protected liberty
and reprehensible behavior is thin. One certainly can find
disagreement about the proper boundary between self-defense
and prosecutable homicide. 3 ' There is similar conflict over
the proper policy impact of distinctions between the blastocyst,
the early term fetus, the late term fetus and the newborn in-
fant who remains dependent on outside help for survival. This
ambivalence is reflected in a common regulatory response to
the two liberties which presumes that the exercise of each
might well be a very bad decision. Waiting periods, common in
both domains, seem to express the hope that upon reflection
No. 101-392 (1989) (House of Representatives Committee on Government
Operations report presenting findings of hearing before the Human Re-
sources and Intergovernmental Affairs Subcommittee and making recom-
mendations for congressional action). But see DAvID C. REARDON, ABORT-
ED WOMEN: SILENT No MORE (1987) (recounting stories of members of
Women Exploited by Abortion).
33 See, e.g., Stange, supra note 96, at 4 (criticizing the dominant
feminist position on self-defense).
337 See, e.g., id. at 39 (discussing the choice of several women wheth-
er to arm themselves against a rapist); Michelman, supra note 227 (argu-
ing that restrictions on abortion hinder a woman's constitutional right of
choice).
338 See, e.g., McClain, supra note 86, at 203 n.30 (discussing the acci-
dental shooting death of a Japanese exchange student).
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the right-bearer will choose a different path.339
D. Law Breaking as a Primary Argument Against
Regulation
Both debates feature the argument that unenforceable prohi-
bitions, resulting in only partial compliance, will cause greater
problems than they solve.34 This type of unintended results
objection appears in many debates but has special significance
here. The unintended consequences of regulation generate, for
gun and abortion-rights supporters, powerful symbols with
which to confront their opposition. 341 The coat hanger in the
abortion context and the NRA's chilling 911 tapes of defense-
less victims being murdered while waiting for police, are re-
minders that eradication of the respective rights will not elimi-
nate the human pain associated with these controversies.
In the gun debate, the argument that criminals will not obey
gun prohibition laws is a common rejoinder to the contention
that strict gun control will make good people safer.342 Ex-
311 In the abortion context, there is Mary Ann Glendon's advocacy of
a French style model that would require a waiting period and counseling.
See McClain, supra note 285, at 1078. The Brady Law waiting period for
purchasing hand-guns is an example in the gun-rights context. See 18
U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
It is difficult to say which right-bearer is more substantially im-
paired by this delay. At first glance, we might say that the pregnant
woman has a larger and longer window of opportunity; that the a period
of repose is not a substantial burden. In contrast, we might imagine the
stalking victim losing her life to a 15 day waiting period for gun pur-
chases like that in California. See -CAL. PENAL CODE §12071(b)(3)(A)
(West Supp. 1997). However, if we focus on those women or girls most at
risk, it is easy to imagine the abortion choice being equally impaired. For
a young, poor girl, who barely gathers enough money and courage to
travel to a place where abortions are available, an unexpected waiting
period might be devastating.
340 This is of course controversial. Opponents would say that the
benefits of abortion prohibitions are the millions of fetuses saved. In the
gun prohibition context, one might hope for the elimination of gun acci-
dents, heat of passion slayings, and black market prices high enough to
reduce minors' unsupervised access to guns.
341 See supra text accompanying notes 326-29.
142 See, e.g., KOPEL, supra note 159, at 415; WRIGHT & ROSsI, supra
note 308, at 227; Kleck, supra note 292, at 19-20.
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treme gun laws, it is argued, will leave honest and compliant
citizens unarmed and worse off by generating greater depen-
dency on government and granting law-breakers more and
better targets by lowering the risk of effective resistance by
victims.
34 3
In the abortion debate, powerful images of back-alley abor-
tions diminish the argument that restricting abortion would be
a purely protective measure. These images emphasize that
abortion restrictions will impair disproportionately the health
and safety of poor women, whose only abortion option might be
an unsafe, illegal one.3
The argument in the two contexts is also different in a way
that aids our comparison. The abortion debate focuses on law-
breaking by the former right-bearer and the abortion provider.
In the gun debate, the former right-bearer is the putative vic-
tim of criminals who will break gun laws the same way that
they break other laws. On this measure, the gun-rights argu-
ment is stronger. Moreover, the woman who chooses the ille-
gal, unsafe abortion does in fact make a conscious choice to
accept the attendant risks. While this is likely to be a very un-
pleasant choice, it is still a degree more control than can be
exercised by the crime victim, who in the model case is thrust
into danger completely involuntarily.
E. Personal Crisis and Political Failure
Both choices involve deeply personal crises attributable in
part to a failure of political and social mechanisms. In the
abortion context, Catharine MacKinnon, Robin West and oth-
ers have highlighted the incongruity of a political scheme that
"compels" women to have children they are ill-prepared to care
for, and then denies them effective assistance once the child is
born. If the abortion right is eliminated without addressing the
needs of young, poor and single mothers, we should view it as
" See sources cited supra note 308.
3" See Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abor-
tion, The Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in American
Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 455-56 (1992) (noting the greater
ability of affluent women to travel to jurisdictions where abortion is
available).
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a political failure. 345 In the context of this failure severe re-
strictions on abortion seem incongruous.
A similar theme arises in the debate about an individual
right to arms. Collective mechanisms do provide some margin-
al protection. We know, however, that the state has no duty to
provide individual physical security346 -a deficiency similar
to the state's failure to assist the pregnant woman. Further,
we know that the state's capacity to protect citizens from crim-
inal attacks, both in practice and in theory, is minimal.347
For many, the assertion that police will be more effective if
" See McClain, supra note 86, at 398-403 (highlighting the dilemma
faced by women who are denied funding for abortions and then subse-
quently denied public assistance).
46 See supra note 89.
" See Johnson, supra note 45; Johnson, supra note 152. This failure
provides a response to a question that plagues the gun-rights debate. If
guns, what guns? If government is incompetent in this area, the gun
control argument goes, it is because individuals have failed to make the
sacrifice of liberty that is essential for government to perform its security
function. See, e.g., Garry Wills, John Lennon's War, CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec.
12, 1980, at 56. Under this view, individual access to firearms reflects a
basic failure of our society to insist upon essential terms in the social
contract. Those who demand their state of nature right to violent self-
4efense are .breaching the agreement to the detriment of us all. (Put
aside for the moment the criticism that the social contract is a fiction,
and the powerful Rawlsian arguments that absent the basic components
of a just society, the social contract includes a right to protect oneself
from the most damaging aspects of societal failure).
But arguably, we have enforced the social contract in this regard.
In the domain of threats that government is competent to meet (e.g.,
large scale military threats), enforcement is apparent. We do not give
individual citizens access to highly destructive weapons-nukes, stinger
missiles, and bazookas. We have drawn the line at tools effective and
necessary for individual self-defense. These tools-rifles, shotguns, and
handguns-might be effective militarily only where citizens used them
cooperatively. And the impulse prompting cooperative self-defense is likely
to be the very thing we would want a citizen's militia to oppose.
Domestic disarmament would be a mistake because it would intro-
duce obligations into the social contract that government cannot
meet-i.e. requiring government to provide individual security from com-
mon criminal threats-forcing citizens to stake their lives on the fiction
of individual security through public mechanisms. See Fletcher, supra
note 75, at 569-70 (analyzing the importance of self-defense against immi-
nent threats and governmental incompetence in this area).
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good people eschew self-defense rings hollow. Many have ar-
gued that beyond the mere assertion, there is little to support
the view that severe gun laws, even if generally obeyed by
good people, will change the behavior of criminals or the effec-
tiveness of the police.348
F. One Stark Contrast
There is finally, a stark and informative contrast between
the anti-abortion and anti-gun positions. It suggests that com-
paratively, the anti-gun argument is on weaker ground.
The result that anti-abortion advocates contemplate is the
pregnant woman having her baby. This is a result plainly
different from, and in their view morally better than, eliminat-
ing the fetus. However one may disagree with it, the position
is at least morally coherent-a restriction on freedom to
achieve a different, arguably, morally better result.
In contrast, anti-gun activists do not promote allowing crimi-
nals to run wild, raping and killing defenseless victims. Rath-
er, they urge delegation. Those facing criminal attack should
call armed police for protection. If any shooting needs to be
done, police will do it. (We do not call police for their mediation
skills). No one seriously contends that police have a better
moral compass, or better judgement than the average citizen.
It might even be a mistake to assume that they meet the aver-
age. They very often are younger and less educated than many
members of the general population to whom anti-gun advocates
would deny a right to armed self-defense.349
If it is immoral to contemplate and use deadly force in self-
defense it is equally immoral to call others to do so.35° In-
deed, there is a deeper moral problem. As Jeffery Snyder asks
"[hiow can you rightfully ask another human being to risk his
life to protect yours, when you will assume no responsibility
for yourself?"35' Moreover, to the degree that police are prone
348 David Kopel highlights evidence that disarmament will make crim-
inals more brazen. See KOPEL, supra note 159, at 414-19.
349 The requirements for New York's finest are one year of college or
military service.
350 See Kates, supra note 32, at 120.
351 Jeffery Snyder, A Nation of Cowards, 113 PUB. INTEREST L. REV.
40, 43 (1993). It is unsatisfactory simply to assert, as the
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to use violence more quickly-a reaction bred by the fear dis-
tilled from repeated confrontations with the toughest and ugli-
est elements of our society 352 -- than would the average citi-
zen, it is morally reprehensible to delegate the defense func-
tion.
VI. REcONCILIATION?
The impulse for Robin West's alternative account of the
abortion right helps us understand how one might adopt the
standard position even while embracing abortion-rights theo-
ries that fall within the intersection. As West shows, many
aspects of the abortion-rights theories that intersect with gun-
rights themes are very problematic for abortion-rights support-
ers.353 West explains that many feminist supporters of the
abortion right come reluctantly, "with some measure of incon-
sistency, or in some way by compromising their overriding
conception of rights. 3 4
The abortion right is symbolic of women's struggles for polit-
Communitarians and Gary Wills do, that the moral person eschews indi-
vidual self-defense in favor of receiving community defense from the
police who represent us all. See Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 446
(decrying the community of individual gun slingers); Wills, supra note
347. First, police generally respond only after the fact. As George Fletch-
er explains, when a threat is imminent, the community cannot respond
to the victim's need for solid physical protection. See Fletcher, supra note
75, at 570. Second, the Mark Fuhrman's of the world do not represent,
and should not be counted on to protect, people of color--especially peo-
ple of color in relationships with white people; nor can the department
that employed him for decades despite his admitted racism. Many whites
would equally deny that Mark Fuhrman represents them or their commu-
nity. The LAPD did not represent Nicole Brown Simpson or deserve her
trust and deference when it did nothing to stop her being repeatedly
brutalized by a man who was rich and famous. I use Mark Fuhrman
because he is current. I have chronicled elsewhere numerous stomach-
turning instances of police misconduct and racism. See Johnson, supra
note 45, at 57 n.181.
352 See William Barhill, Focus: Early Warnings; Identifying Violence-
Prone Police Officers, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1992, at B5 ("The prolonged,
unremitted stress associated with law enforcement often results in a
build-up of undischarged anger . . . waiting for a chance to explode").
" See West, supra note 82, at 963-64.
354 Id. at 964.
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ical equality and social autonomy.355 It may be this symbol-
ism and allegiance to particular feminist goals rather than
commitment to the principles on which one can ground the
right, that most influences support for it. West argues that the
principles on which the abortion right is grounded "simply do
not. 'fit well' [with] the various conceptions of rights held by
[many] pro-choice legal theorists."356
Its grounding in the right of privacy is problematic for pro-
choice radical feminists, who have worked to reveal the private
sphere as a "grim world of terror, abuse and violence" for many
women. 357 Abortion rights are problematic for pro-choice com-
munitarians who applaud collective, normative processes and
the values that emerge from them, and who denigrate the
isolated or anti-social individual. 358 The abortion right is an-
tithetical to the communitarian or republican ideal of collective
democratic choice.35 9 The right also is problematic for the
pro-choice, relational/cultural or difference feminists:3 60 "The
decision to terminate fetal life, whatever prompts it, is hardly
emblematic of the act of care or relationality celebrated as at
the heart of women's distinctive moral sensibility."361
Armed self-defense arguably comes up worse on these ac-
counts. It is emblematic of a stereotypically male form of prob-
lem solving, one many feminists and communitarians would
argue has caused much senseless human suffering.362 Betty
155 See id. at 965-66.
356 Id. at 963.
357 Id.
38 See id.
319 As we have seen from Kopel and Little's critique of the
communitarian proposal for domestic disarmament, individual ownership
of firearms for self-defense is characterized by communitarians as equally
isolated, pre-social or anti-social. See Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at
450-54.
360 See West, supra note 82, at 963. Relational feminists celebrate
differences in women as a virtue. Linda McClain has argued that rela-
tional feminism jeopardizes abortion rights. See Linda C. McClain, "Atom-
istic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1887-88, 1242 (1992).
361 West, supra note 82, at 963.
362 West highlights a common theme. The decision to abort, like the
decision to use deadly force in self-defense, stems from an intense per-
sonal crisis. Collective and other methods of problem solving and avoid-
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Friedan, for example, calls "the trend of women buying guns 'a
horrifying, obscene perversion of feminism. '"33
Abortion rights are also problematic for pro-choice liberals,
West argues, because they do not fit traditional liberal justifi-
cations for rights.364 West explains that "[ulnlike the cere-
bral, cultural, and intellectual activities of the mind celebrated
by Mill and his followers as central to self-development, auton-
omy, and self-identity, the activity protected by this
right-abortion-is profoundly of the body: physical, messy,
quite painful, bloody and ending in a death."315 We can say
the same thing with equal or more force about armed self-de-
fense.
"[Tihe abortion right is equally problematic [for] pro-choice
egalitarian, green, vegetarian, ecological, spiritual, pacifist,
and otherwise gentle feminists, for whom the perspective and
experience of the sentient fetus, who (post-viability) does feel
ance have failed. It is an act of desperation, one step away from argu-
ably the least attractive possibility facing the right-bearer. But as West
points out, each act is inconsistent with the distinctive moral sensibility
that relational feminists have claimed for women. See West, supra note
82, at 963; see also Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors,'
and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Sec-
ond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661, 663, 665 (1989) (urging that sexism
and a perverse fascination with violence underpin the Second Amend-
ment). Douglas Laycock argues that Brown's critique is loaded with cul-
tural bigotry. See Douglas Laycock, Vicious Stereotypes in Polite Society,
8 CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 398 (1991); see also Patricia A. Cain, Femi-
nist Legal Scholarship, 77 IowA L. REV. 19, 37 (1995) (noting her own
gendered perspective, and commenting on her surprise that one would
take offense, rather than empathize with Brown's story).
363 Ann Japenga, Would I Be Safer With a Gun?, HEALTH, March 1,
1994, at 54 (interviewing Betty Friedan). But see Laura Ingrahm, Why
Feminists Should Be Trigger Happy, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1996, at A18
("By disdaining gun ownership, feminists simply add one more brick to
their elitist, Northeastern, Democratic facade"). Query whether Friedan
would argue that "[g]uns are killing us not protecting us," id. (quoting
Betty Friedan), in cases like Judy Norman's. See State v. Norman, 366
S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1988). See also Tom W. Smith & Robert J. Smith,
Changes in Firearms Ownership Among Women, 1980-1994, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 133 (1995) (arguing that pro-gun groups and the
media have exaggerated the rate of gun ownership among women).
311 See West, supra note 82, at 963-964.
36 Id. (citation omitted).
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pain, can never be subordinated to a position of total irrele-
vance."366 Like the Millsian liberals, these gentle feminists
might acknowledge, in theory, some cases where lethal vio-
lence would be justifiable and appropriate. But the same con-
cerns that make abortion problematic for them, also should
prompt their objection to the practical details of a right to
armed self-defense (i.e., practice with and carrying of firearms
and a moral resolve to use one in self-defense).
West's account goes very far as an explanation of the politi-
cal gulf between abortion-rights and gun-rights constituencies.
While the "logical [relations]"6 ' might run parallel, the "hu-
man relations"368 could not diverge more.3 69 But this does
not resolve the most important contradiction revealed by the
intersection. That many abortion-rights supporters come to
that position in spite of the theories and principles on which
the right can be grounded is, in the "non-political" realm of
legal theory, a problem not a solution.317 At the level of legal
theory, adherents to the standard position have work to do.
366 West, supra note 82, at 964 \(citing Ruth Colker, Feminist Litiga-
tion: An Oxymoron?-A Study of the Briefs Filed in William L. Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 137 (1990)).
367 See Wertheimer, supra note 304, at 67.
368 See id.
369 Donald Regan touches on a more central impulse for political
support of abortion rights that suggests that his self-defense and samari-
tan arguments are at the periphery of the abortion argument. Arguing
for heightened scrutiny of abortion laws, Regan notes:
[Wiomen (and perhaps pregnant women especially) have suffered
from a history of discrimination in our society. They have suf-
fered not just from occasional laws counter to their interests, but
from an extensive pattern of discriminatory laws and social prac-
tices. This makes them suspicious and resentful (and justifiably
suspicious and resentful) of any particular inequality, however it
is supposed to be justified.
There are limits to how far logic and analysis can carry
us. . . . [Tihere comes a point at which the judgement of persons
imbued with and sensitive to our traditions is worth more than
hypotheticals and distinctions.
Regan, supra note 11, at 1632, 1636 (emphasis added).
370 See West, supra note 82, at 963-64. West acknowledges that this
is itself problematic because it suggests something unprincipled about the
way all of these people come to their support of abortion rights. See id.
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I treat here, briefly, several points that might be part of that
work. First, one might deny the gun rights/abortion rights
intersection on the grounds that the intersection is with self-
defense, not gun rights; that equating self-defense and gun
rights is imprecise and over-inclusive. It is clear from Gelman's
use of Blackstone371 and Hobbes3 72 and arguably McClain's
invocation of the privileges of castle, 3 that this criticism is
not always the case. But granting the objection allows a useful
comparison.
An illuminating response to the objection of over-inclusive-
ness comes directly from abortion-rights literature. Cass
Sunstein highlights the consensus that the strongest argument
for the abortion right is an equal protection argument ground-
ed in samaritan critiques like Judith Thomson's." 4 Abortion
restrictions force women to lend aid to the fetus, at substantial
personal costs, while not demanding the same of men.375
Sunstein acknowledges that one of the most serious objec-
tions to samaritan/self-defense analogies3 76 is the mother's
duty to the fetus.3 77 His first response is that in cases of rape
or incest, the duty/responsibility criticism surely fails.37 8 This
is, of course, insufficient to sustain a general abortion right,
because only a small fraction of unwanted pregnancies result
from rape or incest.379 A general abortion right is over-inclu-
sive. Sunstein responds that the evidentiary difficulty of distin-
371 See Gelman, supra note 206, at 648-51.
372 See id. at 659-60.
171 See McClain, supra note 285, at 1048 n.236.
374 See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 31 n.120.
375 See id. at 40.
376 Sunstein does not characterize the claim as "samaritan/self-de-
fense." This is my own characterization of Thomson's blending of the two
concepts.
371 Judith Thomson simply dismisses this objection on the view that
parents assume no duty until they voluntarily take the child home. See
Thomson, supra note 14, at 65. Regan treats this issue perfunctorily. See
Regan, supra note 11, at 1612 (arguing that there is no liberty constrain-
ing duty where the woman has attempted to avoid pregnancy).
378 See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 40.
379 See J. Allison Strickland, Rape in Post-Webster Antiabortion Legis-
lation: A Practical Analysis, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 163, 169 &
nn.26-27 (citing surveys that show pregnancies resulting from rape or
incest range from 1-3% of all pregnancies).
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guishing these cases from voluntary or negligent pregnancies
requires us to extend the right generally to all unwanted preg-
nancies.38 °
The objection to equating self-defense with gun rights pres-
ents the same type of problem. In some self-defense cases, the
gun is not an essential tool. It is in others. Employing
Sunstein's approach, the difficulty of segregating the gun and
no gun cases is much more severe. In the abortion case, there
is in fact time for the state to make a determination of rape or
incest, albeit a difficult one. In contrast, the self-defense crisis
is acute. It is literally impossible to pre-determine and segre-
gate those cases where the gun right is essential to self-de-
fense. The imminence of the threat renders government incom-
petent to make this decision. The administrative and eviden-
tiary difficulties that Sunstein raises in the abortion context
pale in comparison.38' Under the Sunstein approach-that
the general right is necessary to protect particular, more com-
pelling cases-the gun right is the stronger case.382
We also might dismiss the objection that self-defense does
not encompass gun rights because the objection does not take
self-defense seriously. I have argued in detail elsewhere why
firearms are uniquely efficient tools of self-defense.8 3 They
equalize differences in strength, size and speed better than any
other tool.3 Their utility is illustrated by the fact that they
are without exception the defense tool of choice by government
380 See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 40-41. Other theories of abortion
rights face similar problems of over-inclusiveness. Not every woman oper-
ates under the disadvantages that Robin West posits as the justifications
for a transitional right to abortion. See West, supra note 82, at 963.
Unless patriarchy ends in a single flash, the justifications for the abor-
tion right will fall away at different times for different women. See id. at
965. Nonetheless, under West's approach, the abortion right would contin-
ue for all women until the complete fall of patriarchy. See id. at 966.
"' See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 40.
382 See id.
383 See Johnson, supra note 45, at 11.
3M See id. at 49. Assume you or someone you love is being threat-
ened by a six foot four, two hundred-fifty pound, knife-wielding, psycho-
path. What tool do you want? Who among us would have denied Nicole
Brown Simpson a revolver in her purse? Attempts to separate self-de-
fense from gun rights do not take these questions seriously.
Vol.50:97186
PRINCIPLES AND PASSIONS
at all levels. Nelson Lund argues that the importance of fire-
arms for self-defense is abundantly clear to the police, "who
scrupulously preserve their own right to carry firearms on and
off duty (and often after they retire as well) even while some of
them advocate disarming those whom the police cannot pro-
tect."385 Asked what he would want for his own wife if she
were assaulted, Dr. Arthur Kellermann (author of the study
driving the slogan that a gun is forty times more likely to
injure a loved one)386 responded: "If that were my wife, would
I want her to have a [.381 special in her hand?... Yeah."87
The peculiar utility of firearms is implicit in feminist cri-
tiques of self-defense by battered women and rape targets.
Jane Cohen describes the gruesome details leading up to Judy
Norman's shooting of her abusive husband. 388 For a woman
like Judy Norman, who has no real access to alternatives to
self-defense against a mate turned monster, denying the gun
option is not just inconvenient, it is a death sentence. Telling
the Judy Normans of the world that they have a right of self-
defense (or an expanded one as some urge) but not a right to
own a gun is a nearly empty gesture that essentially moots
both traditional and progressive feminist theories of self-de-
fense.389
In a discussion of armed self-defense against rape, Don
Kates and Nancy Engberg show that in many cases armed self-
defense may be a woman's only realistic alternative to
rape.39 ° "[Tihe superior physical strength and combat skills
385 Lund, supra note 4, at 62-63.
Commenting on the irony of the arrest of a housing project self-
defense patrol during the Atlanta child murders, Lund argues, "it is hard
to doubt that something is seriously wrong when citizens are reduced to
protecting their children by holding prayer vigils and lighting little can-
dles." Id. at 62 n.146.
386 See Witkin, supra note 178.
387 See Japenga, supra note 363.
388 See Cohen, supra note 185, at 786-91.
389 A student commentator employs the Norman case in her argument
that a meaningful constitutional right to bear arms is vital in light of
evidence showing the effectiveness of defensive handgun use and the fact
that police, friends and neighbors often cannot or will not protect a bat-
tered woman. See Blodgett-Ford, supra note 262, at 531 n.127.
"0 Kates & Engberg, supra note 52, at 879.
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of most men over most women enables even the unarmed rap-
ist to carry out his expressed intent to kill or grievously injure
his victim if she does not comply."39' They acknowledge con-
tentions that "women are less capable of self-defense and less
knowledgeable about firearms,"392 but argue that the stron-
ger criminological studies show that women have no peculiar
disabilities that impair armed self-defense. Moreover, there is
evidence that the "non-lethal weapons recommended for use
against rapists are ... ineffective and likely to provoke great-
er violence."393
Finally, empirical work on armed self-defense demonstrates
that the gun has a non-lethal deterrent or threat value (e.g.,
cases where firing and missing or merely brandishing the gun
drives off aggressors who had anticipated a soft target) that is
unparalleled.394 Criticisms of armed self-defense often ignore
this dramatic deterrent value.395 Responding to Sanford
Levinson's endorsement of an individual right to arms, Wendy
Brown's reference to and apparent preference for her hard won
martial arts skills in confronting rape or other criminal attack
misses this point entirely.396  As between revealing a
holstered gun or shouting "I know karate," one suspects that
even Brown, upon reflection, would choose the gun to face an
approaching potential criminal attacker or a group of them.
One might grant all this but still react that on balance fire-
"' Id. at 882; see also id. at 891 (citing the reversal of a conviction
where the charge implied that the self-defense standard for a woman
defending herself against a man was the same as for an altercation be-
tween two men).
392 Id. at 879 n.18 (citing C. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING, FIREARMS AND
VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 64 (1970)).
193 Id. at 879 n.19. See also James B. Jacobs, The Regulation of Per-
sonal Chemical Weapons: Some Anomalies in American Weapons Law, 15
U. DAYTON L. REv. 141, 144 (1989).
" See KLECK, supra note 8, at 111, 146.
39' This is one of the flaws in the often referenced New England
Journal of Medicine study contending that a firearm in the home puts a
family at greater risk-i.e., failure to consider the extremely large num-
ber of defensive gun uses where the weapon is not fired, along with the
failure to distinguish justifiable homicides by battered women. See
Witken, supra note 178. See also Kates et al., supra note 171, at 539-41;
Blodgett-Ford, supra note 262, at 534-38.
396 Brown, supra note 362, at 666.
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arms seem to cause more trouble than they are worth. This
position requires serious consideration of the empirical work to
the contrary.397 On at least the broad question of the net util-
ity of armed self-defense, it is becoming very hard to sustain
the standard position on the glib contention that one is worse
off having a gun.398 And there is still the argument that ex-
tinguishing gun rights would submerge choice in personal
crisis into a homogenized formulation of utility-certainly
something supporters would object to in the abortion con-
text.399
We might be left to explain the standard position in terms of
pure ideology or passion that renders the intersection irrele-
vant.4"' The reason is suggested by another critique of Gary
Kleck's Point Blank. Reviewing Kleck, social scientist, Law-
rence Ross, commends Kleck's meticulous clarification of the
misinformation with which the gun debate is obfuscated, (e.g.,
Kleck's demonstration that "fewer than 1% of all guns, and
fewer than 2% even of handguns [are] used in a violent crime
[and that] more people are killed in swimming pool accidents
than in firearms accidents").40 ' Ross does not take issue with
Kleck's finding that handguns are more often used by good
people to repel crimes than by felons in committing them.
However, Ross contends that:
despite the masses of data and the cleverness of his analysis
and argument, Kleck's policy position does not satisfy me....
[Kleck] seems to easily to embrace a society based on an
internal as well as an external balance of terror. The social
order is seen to rest adequately on masses of potential vic-
tims using the threat of gun violence to deter masses of po-
tential armed criminals .... [This] spectacle is one that ought
397 See supra note 308.
'98 See supra note 178.
'9' See supra Part II.E.
,0 For one commentator a push for "domestic disarmament" repre-
sents an engine for creation of "a true progressive movement culture"
that would galvanize voters to do battle with "multinational capitalism."
Eric Alterman, Who Speaks for Me? Political Progressive Activism, 19
MOTHER JONES 58, 64 (1994).
401 Lawrence Ross, Book Review, 98 AM. J. SOC. 661, 661 (1992)
(reviewing GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA
(1991)).
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to disgust rather than cheer the civilized observer.4 °2
The reasons that people view either the abortion or the gun
right with "disgust" are well beyond what I have tried to evalu-
ate here. If it is predominately a visceral, passionate disgust at
the idea of armed self-defense that fuels the standard position,
then what are we to make of the articulated principles wherein
the two rights intersect?
On things as deeply controversial as the freedom to choose
abortion, or a firearm for self-defense, perhaps it is wrong to
believe that articulated principles can trump human passions.
This suspicion is strengthened in the abortion context by Jus-
tice Blackmun's observation in Casey: "I am 83 years old. I
cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step down,
the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on
the issue before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly where
the choice ... will be made."4 °3
If politics, ideology, and passion4 4 explain everything,
402 Id. at 662 (emphasis added). Noting that the shooting of James
Brady prompted stricter gun control measures, Ross posits the value of
"more incidents, more heinous ones with more tragic or more important
victims [to prompt us] to develop the necessary determination" to go
beyond narrow gun controls toward citizen disarmament. Id.
403 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1991) (Blackmun,
J., concurring). David Kopel's discussion reflects this in the gun-rights
context. See Kopel & Little, supra note 201, at 455-56 (contrasting the
relative damage and utility of guns and alcohol and showing that "our"
tolerance of alcohol stems from its status as the establishment drug of
choice).
404 I think I understand the power of passion on these issues. Recent-
ly I had an experience that makes me question the capacity of debate to
change people's minds on these issues. I was watching a PBS program
describing the havoc caused by land mines left from military conflicts
around the globe. It showed a training exercise in which soldiers handled
and learned to set mines. American military officials explained that they
used land mines responsibly and that mines served vital tactical purpos-
es. See Nova: Terror in the Minefield (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 9,
1996).
It made me sick. I was repelled just viewing the device. It seemed
to be all that is evil distilled into a single small package. You would
have a better chance convincing me that the Devil is really just misun-
derstood, than convincing me that there are any redeeming qualities to
land mines. It is not that my mind is closed. It is just that here, my
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then the intersection between abortion and gun-rights theories
is irrelevant. But if this is so, then the discrete theories are
irrelevant as well, and the rights that they support are no
more secure than the seats of freshman members of Con-
gress.405
CONCLUSION
Consider two problems: an unwanted fetus kicking in the
womb and a criminal kicking through the back door. What set
of principles makes the abortion response to the first problem
a vital, fundamental right, but transforms armed response to
the second into "grim madness?"4 6
The passions that influence positions on abortion and gun
rights seem to grow from different impulses. But when we look
to articulated principles and theories of rights the two liberties
share a great deal. If we ignore these common
themes-embracing a principle in support of one right, while
abandoning it in the context of the other-we invite the charge
that our principles are merely rationalizations for our passions.
hard-wired visceral reactions against danger, are completely dominant. Is
it wholly different from reason or logic? No argument that I can imagine
can convince me to abandon my revulsion against these devices in favor
of some statistical, tactical military, supply and demand, ease of manu-
facture argument that banning them would be unrealistic or counter-
productive. I think many people have a similar reaction to images used
in the gun and abortion debates. Certainly we can find many serious
people expressing their hatred of guns. See, e.g., supra text accompanying
notes 12, 145, 402. Others express the same sentiment about the abor-
tion.
405 Proponents of Critical Legal Studies might argue that this is pre-
cisely the case. See Morton J. Horowitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 393, 399 (1988).
406 Donna Shalala, presumably reflecting the views of the Clinton Ad-
ministration, has branded the decision of families to keep a loaded gun
for personal security "grim madness." See supra note 10. According to
Handgun Control Inc., Chairperson Sarah Brady, "The only reason for
guns in civilian hands is for sporting purposes." Tom Jackson, Keeping
the Battle Alive, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 21, 1993, at Baylife 1 (interviewing
Sarah Brady). The Clinton Administration's stand on abortion as an es-
sential and fundamental choice for women is also clear. See supra note 9.
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